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HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL: CHOICE OF LAW AND
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION
Roger P. Alford∗
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the Alien Tort Statute. As
such, international human rights litigation as currently practiced in the United
States is dead. The demise of the ATS will signal the rise of transnational tort
litigation. Virtually every complaint pleading a human rights violation could
allege a traditional domestic or foreign tort violation. With transnational tort
claims, there is no presumption against extraterritoriality. Instead, courts
apply state or foreign tort laws based on traditional choice-of-law principles.
The purpose of this Article is to outline the future of human rights litigation
in the United States by reframing human rights as international wrongs
resolved through transnational tort litigation. This Article analyzes Kiobel’s
impact on the future of human rights litigation and introduces transnational
tort litigation as a viable alternative, with particular focus on the competing
choice-of-law approaches. It then describes how these choice-of-law
approaches have been applied in the international terrorism context and likely
would be applied in the human rights context. This Article concludes with a
detailed analysis of the virtues of transnational tort litigation, with specific
emphasis on extraterritoriality, universality, liability thresholds, corporate
liability, damages, notice pleading, forum non conveniens, and preemption.
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INTRODUCTION
Human rights violations are transnational torts. Torture is assault and
battery. Terrorism is wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment. Federal
law concedes as much, vesting federal courts with jurisdiction over “any civil
action by an alien for . . . tort[s] only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”1 Until the Supreme Court’s decision
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,2 foreigners could rely on this
statute—commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)3—to sue
individuals or entities for human rights violations that occurred anywhere in
the world. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality to severely limit the territorial reach of the ATS,4 the
most important human rights statute in the United States. Henceforth, the only
claims that may go forward under the ATS are those that touch and concern the
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.5 The overwhelming majority of ATS claims will not
satisfy this test. As such, human rights litigation as currently practiced in the
United States is dead.
The demise of the ATS will signal the rise of transnational tort litigation.
When one compares facts and considers remedies, virtually every complaint
pleading an ATS violation could allege a traditional domestic or foreign tort
violation. It is perhaps unseemly to treat grave human rights abuses as gardenvariety torts.6 But with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel,
reframing human rights violations as transnational torts may be the only viable
alternative for redressing international wrongs through U.S. litigation. In the
quest to provide relief for victims of grave abuse, international human rights
violations should be reframed as transnational torts. With common law tort
claims, there is no presumption against extraterritoriality. Instead, there is a
decision to apply state or foreign tort law based on choice-of-law principles.

1
2
3

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added).
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
The ATS is also sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) or the Alien Tort Act

(ATA).
4

Id. at 1669.
Id.
6 See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that municipal tort law is
an inadequate placeholder for the kinds of wrongs meant to be addressed by the ATS); Paul Hoffman & Beth
Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 9, 21
(2013) (citing Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 183).
5
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Reframing human rights as transnational torts is not novel in practice, but it
has been ignored by the legal academy. In the terrorism context, plaintiffs have
used this tactic to secure billions of dollars in judgments against state sponsors
of terrorism.7 They typically have done so by invoking choice-of-law
principles to apply domestic tort laws to redress foreign terrorist attacks.8 The
United States’ interest in combatting international terrorism has been the
decisive factor leading to the application of domestic law, which typically
results in the application of state tort law of the plaintiffs’ domicile.9
A similar approach could be undertaken with respect to other human rights
violations. Rather than pursuing claims for wrongful conduct under the ATS,
those same victims could plead violations of domestic or foreign tort laws.
Courts seized with such claims would apply choice-of-law principles to assess
the appropriate tort law to resolve the dispute. If the United States has a
paramount interest in addressing the human rights violation, then that likely
will result in the application of domestic tort law. Otherwise, traditional
choice-of-law analysis applied in the international human rights context will
often result in the application of foreign tort law.
As a practical matter, transnational tort litigation allows state and federal
courts to continue to adjudicate international human rights claims. Kiobel’s
territorial limitations will result in the dismissal of most ATS claims. But
claims based on the same facts can continue in state and federal courts
pursuant to either state or foreign tort laws. Accordingly, human rights
litigation will survive the demise of the ATS by reframing the facts, pleading
tort violations, and applying either state or foreign tort laws.
As a normative matter, transnational tort litigation is preferable to human
rights litigation because it avoids the uncertainties and concerns typically
raised about ATS litigation.10 With human rights litigation in the United States,
courts will favor the commonplace over the exotic. Even prior to Kiobel, courts
were skeptical of ATS litigation,11 but routinely employed choice-of-law rules
7 See Jeewon Kim, Note, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of Powers Discourse
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 524 (2004); infra text
accompanying note 176.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 107–75.
9 See Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell II), No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL
756090, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 19–24.
11 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 770 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011);
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 71–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part),
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to resolve cross-border tort claims.12 Courts’ familiarity with choice-of-law
analysis is one of its greatest virtues. It is also familiar to the relevant
stakeholders in transnational tort litigation. Choice-of-law analysis
accommodates the interests of other nations, the expectations of the parties,
and the needs of the interstate system. It applies the law one would expect: the
law that advances legitimate governmental interests and that has the closest
connection to the dispute and the parties. As such, the routine application of
choice of law in the transnational torts context avoids many of the
controversial questions raised by ATS litigation. For plaintiffs, transnational
tort litigation in state courts has many virtues when compared to ATS litigation
in federal courts, including the extraterritorial application of common law tort
claims, lower pleading standards and liability thresholds, corporate
responsibility for tortious conduct, fewer dismissals on the basis of preemption
or forum non conveniens, and universal acceptance of a private right of action
for intentional torts.
The purpose of this Article is to outline the future of human rights litigation
in the United States by reframing human rights as international wrongs
resolved through transnational tort litigation. Choice of law will feature as the
key question for the future of transnational tort litigation. Although there are
other relevant issues that arise when human rights litigation is reframed as
transnational tort litigation, choice of law is the most salient, unsettled, and
underappreciated. There is neither scholarly literature that attempts to reframe
human rights violations as transnational torts nor any scholarship that
systematically analyzes international terrorism and human rights violations
through a choice-of-law lens.
Part I of this Article summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel
with particular attention to the consequences that decision has for the demise
of ATS litigation and the rise of transnational tort litigation. Because the
presumption against extraterritoriality severely limits the reach of the ATS,
plaintiffs have few alternatives other than alleging violations of domestic or
foreign tort laws.

vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 255 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2009) (Wesley, J.,
dissenting); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 384 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Viet. Ass’n for
Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 296 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553
U.S. 1028 (2008).
12 See infra note 41.
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Part II of this Article briefly introduces the choice-of-law approaches
applied in the United States, particularly as applied to the transnational context.
After Kiobel, the choice of the appropriate tort law will be critical for resolving
claims alleging international wrongful conduct. Unfortunately, choice of law in
the United States is confusing, with fifty-two jurisdictions adopting several
different choice-of-law approaches. Understanding transnational tort litigation
requires an appreciation of these different approaches.
This Article then outlines the past and future of human rights litigation
reframed as transnational tort litigation. Part III provides a detailed analysis of
how choice-of-law principles have been successfully applied to redress
international terrorism. Because terrorism triggers paramount governmental
interests, more often than not courts have applied domestic tort laws to resolve
international terrorism disputes.
Part IV addresses how the divergent choice-of-law approaches might be
applied in the human rights context, with specific reference to how courts
might determine the appropriate law when faced with the facts of well-known
human rights cases. Unlike in terrorism cases, a choice-of-law analysis of
human rights violations committed on foreign soil typically results in the
application of foreign law. That is to say, if one analyzes the major choice-oflaw approaches and applies them to the facts of prominent human rights cases,
courts will typically apply foreign tort laws to resolve claims alleging foreign
conduct that causes foreign injuries.
Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of the virtues of transnational
tort litigation. Lest one assume that transnational tort litigation is a poor
alternative to human rights litigation, this Article outlines the numerous
advantages of this approach over traditional human rights litigation. First, state
tort laws have no presumption against extraterritoriality. Second, tort laws are
universal, with almost every jurisdiction providing civil remedies for negligent
or intentional conduct that harms others. Third, tort laws have much lower
liability thresholds than the standards applied under international law, allowing
claims to be brought for intentional torts, simple negligence, and strict products
liability. Fourth, tort laws recognize corporate liability without the need to
show that the entity aided and abetted government abuse with the requisite
intent. Fifth, choice-of-law rules are sufficiently nuanced to apply one law to
determine liability and another law to determine damages. Sixth, tort claims
pursued under state law in state court permit notice pleading, obviating the
need to satisfy the heightened pleading standard applicable in federal court.
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Seventh, forum non conveniens does not have the same force or favor in state
courts as in federal courts. Eighth, preemption will rarely be an issue where a
court applies state or foreign tort laws to resolve the dispute.
I. KIOBEL AND THE DEMISE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The history of international human rights litigation under the ATS is wellknown.13 Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,14 such litigation has become something
of a cottage industry, with over 150 cases filed alleging the commission of a
tort in violation of the law of nations.15 The ATS became one of the most
important litigation vehicles for victims of human rights abuses. Contingency
and pro bono lawyers well-versed in international law could sue deep-pocket
corporations for aiding and abetting grave foreign governmental misconduct.
For over two decades, interpretation of the ATS developed without the benefit

13 There is extensive commentary on both the history of the ATS and the litigation that it has spawned.
See generally, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011) (discussing the history and meaning of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney
General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509 (2012) (explaining debates
over the ATS and the reliance by participants in those debates on a 1795 opinion by U.S. Attorney General
William Bradford); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002)
(detailing the history of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) (analyzing the
Court’s Sosa decision within the context of its Erie decision and considering several areas of likely debate
concerning the ATS); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations
on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that “the Framers
wanted to give the federal courts jurisdiction over suits involving the law of nations”); Ryan Goodman &
Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 (1997) (discussing Filartiga, “[t]he break-through ATCA case”); Eugene
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort
Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting a debate concerning the ATS: whether it merely
grants jurisdiction or allows suits to be brought on the basis of “customary international law”); Julian G. Ku,
The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial
Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 353 (2011) (challenging the common perception that the ATS “imposes
liability on private corporations for violations of customary international law”); Thomas H. Lee, The SafeConduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006) (advancing the “safe-conduct
theory,” which posits a new role for the ATS—it would permit redress of common law torts that private actors
commit so long as there is a U.S. nexus); Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary
International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2012) (observing that most scholarly debate on customary
international law has focused on litigation over the ATS).
14 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
15 See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court
Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 460 (2011); Michael Goldhaber, The Life
and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/
LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202473215797 (citing Jonathan C. Drimmer, Corporate ATCA Cases, AM. LAW.
DAILY, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ATS%20Cases.pdf (last visited May 4, 2014).
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of U.S. Supreme Court review.16 Finally in 2004, the Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain limited the scope of the ATS, but left the door ajar to further
litigation, “subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”17 The central holding of Sosa was
that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that nonetheless permitted common
law causes of action for torts committed in violation of “the present-day law of
nations,” provided those claims rested on accepted international norms and
were defined with sufficient specificity.18
Since that time, lower courts struggled to answer the many questions Sosa
left unresolved.19 Among the open questions were whether claimants were
required to exhaust local remedies,20 alien claims against aliens were
cognizable federal questions,21 corporations were amenable to suit under

16 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932, 944–56 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103–06 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1999); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771–73
(9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadz̆ ić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg.,
965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
17 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
18 Id. at 725. The Court stated that the modern-day international norms must be “accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” namely
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 715, 724–25.
19 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743–44 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe VIII v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,
174 (2d Cir. 2009); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 374–75 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 560 U.S. 305 (2010);
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v.
Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
262 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
20 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 743; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024–25; Exxon, 654 F.3d at 27; Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1096–97, (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Rosica (Rose)
Popova, Sarei v. Rio Tinto and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims
Act: Short-Term Justice, but at What Cost?, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 517, 518 (2007).
21 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 752–54; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 309–10; Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767,
782–83 (6th Cir. 2007); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Response, Sosa, Federal Question Jurisdiction, and Historical
Fidelity, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 15, 16 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.
org/files/bellia.pdf.
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international law,22 corporations were liable for aiding and abetting
governmental misconduct,23 and the ATS applied extraterritorially.24
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel issued a landmark
decision that signals the end of this Filartiga human rights revolution. It did so
by embracing the presumption against extraterritoriality, a presumption
designed to avoid “unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.”25 The Court concluded
that nothing in the text, history, or purpose of the statute negated a presumption
against extraterritoriality.26 The text provides no evidence that Congress
intended causes of action to have extraterritorial reach.27 The history of the
statute offers instances in which the statute was applied within the United
States and on the high seas, but little to no support for its application on the
territory of another sovereign.28 The purpose of the statute was not to transform
the fledgling country into “the custos morum of the whole world,”29 but rather
to provide a means for “judicial relief to foreign officials injured in the United
States.”30 Therefore, the Court held the presumption against extraterritoriality
applied to limit the reach of the ATS.31

22 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1015; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116–17 (2d Cir.
2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Viet. Ass’n, 517 F.3d at 108; Ku, supra note 13, at 354–
55; Julian Ku, Response: Rethinking the Direction of the Alien Tort Statute, 100 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2219–21
(2012).
23 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748–49; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188; Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315; Khulumani, 504
F.3d at 260; Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007); Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and
Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 306 (2008).
24 See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 318 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012); Exxon, 654 F.3d at 18–20; Sikhs for
Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
25 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
26 Id. at 1661.
27 Id. at 1666 (“The reference to ‘tort’ does not demonstrate that the First Congress ‘necessarily meant’
for those causes of action to reach conduct in the territory of a foreign sovereign. In the end, nothing in the text
of the ATS evinces the requisite clear indication of extraterritoriality.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
28 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–67 (“Nor does the historical background against which the ATS was
enacted overcome the presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.”).
29 Id. at 1668 (quoting United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551)) (“[T]here is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms. . . . The ATS ensured that the United States could
provide a forum for adjudicating such incidents.”).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1669.
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As applied to the facts in Kiobel, the case had almost no connection to the
United States: Nigerian plaintiffs were suing Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations for alleged human rights violations that occurred in Nigeria.32
Given that all the relevant conduct occurred outside the United States, the
Court concluded that the statute did not reach the plaintiffs’ claims.33 As for
other claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United States,” the
Court concluded that “they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”34
The Kiobel decision is complex and confusing, offering scant guidance as
to how lower courts should proceed when claims touch and concern U.S.
territory. However, the purpose of this Article is not to analyze Kiobel, but
rather to consider the future of human rights litigation in the United States in
light of Kiobel.35 The effective result of Kiobel is to severely limit ATS
litigation in the United States. The old Filartiga paradigm of using the statute
to redress human rights violations of foreign defendants committed against
foreign plaintiffs on foreign soil36 is dead. Because “[m]odern ATS litigation
almost always involves conduct that took place outside the United States,”37
the presumption against extraterritoriality will foreclose the vast majority of
ATS cases. To be sure, future litigation will clarify how sufficient the
territorial nexus to the United States must be to rebut the presumption. Thus

32

Id. at 1662, 1669.
Id. at 1669.
34 Id.
35 For detailed analysis of the Court’s decision in Kiobel, see generally, for example, Roger P. Alford,
The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Anthony J.
Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2014); Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the Door
Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); William R. Casto, The ATS Cause of Action Is Sui
Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363695;
William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014);
Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with International Trends, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The
Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Ralph
G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” the United States: Justice
Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the
Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Carlos M. Vazquez, Things We Do with
Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014);
Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM.
J. INT’L L. 601 (2013).
36 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
37 Bradley, supra note 13, at 512.
33
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far, lower courts have required substantial contact with the territory of the
United States to rebut the presumption.38
If the ATS as we know it is dead, what avenues will human rights victims
pursue going forward? At least for claims filed in the United States, the answer
is transnational tort litigation.39 In virtually every instance, conduct that
constitutes an international human rights violation is also cognizable as
wrongful conduct under domestic or foreign tort laws. Invoking state law in
pursuit of human rights is not novel.40 As discussed below, there are dozens of

38 See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–93 (2d Cir. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud &
Partners, No. 4:09-CV-1237, 2014 WL 198305, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2014); In re S. African Apartheid
Litig., No. 02 MDL 1499(SAS), 2013 WL 6813877, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013); Tymoshenko v.
Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *3–4 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013); Adhikari v.
Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent.
Bank, No. 10-483(RCL), 2013 WL 4427943, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v.
Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756, at *13–15 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013); Giraldo v.
Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *5–6 & n.4, *8–9 & n.6 (N.D. Ala. July 25,
2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858, 865–67 (E.D. Va. 2013); see also Roger
Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Interpreting “Touch and Concern,” OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2013, 9:59 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/19/kiobel–insta–symposium–interpreting–touch–and–concern/
(discussing
Kiobel’s reliance on Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), in interpreting when
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption).
But see Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (holding
the presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome by the defendant’s status as a permanent resident of
the United States), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013).
39 Another possibility is the Torture Victim Protection Act, but that statute is of limited use because it
applies only to torture and extrajudicial killings and because it precludes claims against governments,
corporations, and nongovernmental entities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012) (Torture Victim Protection);
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710–11 (2012) (holding that claims against an “individual”
within the meaning of the statute are limited to natural persons). For a discussion of the limits of pursuing
human rights under other federal or state statutes, see Alford, supra note 35; Christopher A. Whytock, Donald
Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013). For a discussion about pursuing human
rights claims as either federal or state common law causes of action, see Colangelo, supra note 35; Roger
Alford, Does the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Apply to the ATS or the Underlying Federal Common
Law Claims?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:11 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/24/presumptionextraterritoriality-apply-ats-federal-common-law-claims/; Anthony Colangelo, Kiobel and Conflicts of Law,
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-colangelo-kiobelconflicts-law/; and William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to
Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-postdodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/.
40 Even at the time the ATS was enacted, Congress recognized that redress in state courts was available
for intentional torts, including claims by aliens against aliens. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 13, at 450–51,
520; see also Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3
UC IRVINE L. REV. 81, 84–86 (2013) (discussing transitory tort claims filed in state courts in the late
eighteenth century).
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human rights cases that have alleged common law tort violations.41 Indeed, the
facts of Kiobel represent an example of plaintiffs alleging state and foreign tort
law violations in addition to ATS claims.42 This practice of relying on state tort
laws to press human rights claims has been almost completely ignored by the
legal academy,43 and no scholarship has analyzed the choice-of-law questions
presented by such human rights litigation. The predicate question for the
application of tort laws is which law should be applied? That question depends
on the forum’s application of choice-of-law principles.
II. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW MAZE
The future of human rights litigation in the United States requires the
reframing of human rights violations as common law torts. Plaintiffs are
already signaling their embrace of state tort laws in lieu of the ATS,44 and
corporate defendants are anxiously wondering, “If the ATS cannot rule the
world, how can state law rule the world?”45 The answer is that state law will
not “rule the world,” assuming courts undertake a proper choice-of-law
analysis. After Kiobel, whether to apply state or foreign tort law will be a
central question, perhaps the central question, in future human rights litigation
in the United States. With the demise of the ATS, the choice of the appropriate
41 In addition to the terrorism cases alleging common law tort violations discussed in Part III, there are
dozens of ATS cases that have alleged common law tort claims. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679
F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2012); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A., 578 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009); Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 171, 172
n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated by
Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. 1702; Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008); Abagninin v.
Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2008); Arias v. DynCorp, 928 F. Supp. 2d. 10, 14 (D.D.C.
2013); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1300 (S.D. Fla.
2010); Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 6, at 10. See generally Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 15
(discussing the ATS and the increasing number of transnational tort cases).
42 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2000) (arising from the same set
of facts as Kiobel and alleging both state and foreign tort law violations).
43 For a recent symposium (in which the author presented a draft of this Article) on human rights in state
courts and under state law, see Symposium, Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3
UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013).
44 See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013); Class Action
Complaint at 55–64, Georges v. United Nations, No. 1:13-cv-07146-JPO (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013); cf. Hoffman
& Stephens, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that “state tort claims may . . . be significantly broader than ATS
claims”).
45 DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SHOULD STATE LAW RULE
THE WORLD? A CALL FOR CAUTION IN APPLYING STATE LAW TO TRANSNATIONAL TORT CASES 15 (2013),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/StateLawRuletheWorld.pdf.
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tort law will be the fulcrum for resolving claims alleging transnational
wrongful conduct.
Unfortunately, choice of law is one of the more complex subjects of
transnational law, presenting a maze of confusing passages, wrong turns, and
intersecting paths.46 In the torts context, it is one of the few areas of law that
requires an annual spreadsheet to simply comprehend the subject.47 Rigid rules
create harsh results, so in their place courts have adopted a labyrinth of
confusing choice-of-law principles for the exercise of sound judgment.
The principal reason for this complexity is that the different approaches
reflect different priorities.48 Most jurisdictions focus on relationships, such that
the law governing a dispute will be that of the jurisdiction that has the most
significant relationship to the events or the parties.49 Other jurisdictions focus
on territory, so that the substantive law governing the dispute will be the law
of the place of the wrong: lex loci delicti.50 A few jurisdictions focus on
governmental interests, with one version balancing competing interests51 and
the other focusing on the forum’s interests.52 Still fewer jurisdictions focus on
outcomes, so that the law governing the dispute will be that which produces the
best result.53 Finally, a handful of jurisdictions do not focus on any one theme,
but adopt an eclectic approach that combines elements of the other
approaches.54
It should come as no surprise that choice of law is in such a state of
confusion. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., federal
courts defer to state choice-of-law rules, and state courts are free to balance

46

Writing over a half century ago, one scholar described the discipline as “a dismal swamp . . . inhabited
by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.” William L. Prosser,
Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
47 See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth
Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309 tbl.1 (2012).
48 For a detailed discussion of the various approaches, see PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON
C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.1–.27 (5th ed. 2010).
49 See infra text accompanying notes 57–68.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 69–75.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 82–85.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 86–89.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 92–100.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 101–06.
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competing concerns as they see fit.55 If state courts in fifty-two jurisdictions
are free to pick and choose among various priorities, the possible solutions to
the choice-of-law conundrum are almost immeasurable. With so many inputs,
probability analysis would reveal literally hundreds of available outcomes. It is
little wonder that even the most sophisticated jurists find it difficult to untie the
Gordian knot.
Despite this invitation to Bedlam, courts have settled on a smaller menu of
choices, such that today one can discern a distinct majority approach and a
handful of minority positions. The remainder of this section briefly outlines the
five choice-of-law approaches, an appreciation of which is essential before one
can invoke choice of law to resolve transnational tort disputes.56 Each
approach has its own unique emphasis that determines whether foreign or
domestic tort law should apply to resolve transnational human rights
violations.
A. Majority Approach: Most Significant Relationship
A majority of states have adopted some version of the Restatement
(Second) approach, applying the law of the jurisdiction that has the most
significant relationship to the dispute.57 Twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted
this approach,58 three other states have a truncated version of it,59 and several
others adopt an eclectic approach that incorporates elements of it.60 As such,
the majority approach is unmatched in its influence on modern choice-of-law
jurisprudence.

55 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)) (holding that, in a diversity case, the district court must apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which it sits).
56 While there are choice-of-law summaries available, see HAY ET AL., supra note 48, §§ 2.01–.27; see
generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (6th ed. 2010), this Article
focuses on the international application of these approaches.
57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
58 These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1.
59 These jurisdictions—Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico—embrace the general rules of
section 145 but not the principles of section 6. See Bonn v. P.R. Int’l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 91–92 (1st
Cir. 1975); Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ind. 2004); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515
N.E.2d 1071, 1073–74 (Ind. 1987); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972); Fernández v. Am.
Sur. Co. of N.Y., 93 P.R. 28, 46 (1966). See generally HAY ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.22 (discussing how
Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico have adopted the so-called significant contacts approach).
60 See infra text accompanying notes 101–06.

ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

6/9/2014 9:06 AM

HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL

1103

Under this approach courts combine almost a dozen incongruent
ingredients to achieve a palatable result. Seven disparate factors are considered
in the analysis:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease
61
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

After mixing these together, courts combine other ingredients, considering a
nonexhaustive list of contacts:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
62
parties is centered.

Finally, the Restatement (Second) suggests that courts apply various
rebuttable presumptions. With torts involving personal injury or wrongful
death, courts give presumptive weight to the place of injury.63 Thus, if torture
or extrajudicial killings are reframed as transnational torts, the presumption is
that the lex loci delicti should control.64
Many courts emphasize the general sections over the presumptions, with
the result that factors other than lex loci delicti often control.65 This is
particularly so when the parties share common domiciles but the injuries occur
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6(2). Not all of these factors require equal
emphasis, particularly in the torts context. Id. § 145 cmt. b (explaining that the four factors of particular
relevance in the torts context “are the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant policies of
the forum, the relevant policies of other interested states and particularly of the state with the dominant interest
in the determination of the particular issue, and ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied”).
62 Id. § 145(2).
63 Id. §§ 146, 156, 175.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 948 A.2d 955, 973–76 (Conn. 2008); Veasley v. CRST Int’l, Inc., 553
N.W.2d 896, 897–99 (Iowa 1996); Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572–73 (Me. 1995); In re Estate of
Blanton, 2001-CA-00264-SCT (¶¶ 11–15) (Miss. 2002); Burhenn v. Dennis Supply Co., 2004 SD 91, ¶¶ 24–
28, 685 N.W.2d 778, 784–85; Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318–19 (Tex. 1979); Forsman v.
Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219–20 (Utah 1989); Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 132 (Vt. 1998); Miller v.
White, 702 A.2d 392, 394–97 (Vt. 1997); Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 P.2d 1213, 1217–19 (Wash. 1994).
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elsewhere.66 Other courts take the presumptions quite seriously, and typically
apply the lex loci delicti.67 In the international context in particular, courts
favor the territorial presumption to limit the debilitating legal uncertainties that
result if individuals carry their domiciliary law wherever they go.68
B. First Minority Approach: Lex Loci Delicti
The majority approach is the dominant methodology, but there are notable
minority positions, and none is more significant than lex loci delicti. The focus
of this approach is on territory, not relationships. Ten jurisdictions retain this
traditional approach for torts.69
Under this traditional approach, adopted by the Restatement (First), “[t]he
place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor
liable for an alleged tort takes place.”70 Because injury is necessary for
liability, the traditional rule “applie[s] the law of the place where the injury
occurred.”71 In most human rights cases—torture, extrajudicial killings,
slavery, and terrorism—the place of wrongful conduct and injury will
coincide.72 Where the tort and injuries occur abroad, jurisdictions adopting the
territorial test will resolve the dispute by applying the foreign law where the
injuries occurred.73
66

See, e.g., Myers, 721 A.2d at 132; Miller, 702 A.2d at 393, 397.
See, e.g., Clinton v. Enter. Rent-a-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895–96 (Del. 2009); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty
Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980); Grover v. Isom, 53 P.3d 821, 824 (Idaho 2002); Townsend v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ill. 2007); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, ¶¶ 31–35,
298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002; Malena v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 850, 856–58 (Neb. 2002); P.V. v.
Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 461, 468 (N.J. 2008); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 289–90 (Ohio
1984).
68 See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Jack L. Goldsmith &
Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1147 (2007) (“Lex loci eliminates . . . distorting economic effect by ensuring that all firms are
subject to the same standard of liability for torts committed in a particular place.”).
69 These jurisdictions are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1.
70 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 705 (2004) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11–
12 (1962)). This rule occasionally will have curious results, particularly when the location of injury is
fortuitous.
72 In some cases, the wrongful conduct will be in one jurisdiction whereas the injuries will occur
elsewhere. In such cases, the law of the place of injury usually will apply. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 377 cmt. a, note 1.
73 See, e.g., Baker v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 358 F. App’x 476, 481 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying Kyrgyz
law for injuries suffered in Kyrgyzstan); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that where tort and subsequent injuries
67
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To blunt the harsh results of a strict adherence to the lex loci delicti rule,
jurisdictions apply various “escape devices,” most notably an exception that
precludes the application of foreign law if doing so offends the public policy of
the forum.74 When lex loci delicti dictates the application of foreign law, a
court may refuse “to enforce a right of action which accrued under the law of
another state” if the court concludes that “it is against good morals or natural
justice, or that for some other such reason the enforcement of it would be
prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens.”75 By grafting a public
policy exception onto the traditional test, courts guarantee that the forum’s
fundamental interests are protected.
C. Second Minority Approach: Governmental Interests
The second minority approach focuses on the governmental interests at
stake in the dispute. Interests flow out of the intersection of governmental
policies and governmental relationships with the parties, events, or litigation.76
As articulated by Brainerd Currie, choice of law is about balancing competing
interests among jurisdictions that have a legitimate basis to effectuate their
policies.77 Under this approach, courts determine whether the forum has a

occurred in India, jurisdictions adopting the traditional lex loci delicti test would apply Indian law), aff’d as
modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 780 (D. Kan.
1981) (“Under lex loci delicti the law of the place of accident (France) would govern.”); Raskin v. Allison, 57
P.3d 30, 32 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (“We have no hesitation in finding that the lex loci delicti rule would apply
in tort cases notwithstanding the injuries were incurred in a foreign country.”).
74 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001: Fifteenth Annual Survey, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2002) (“[T]he remaining traditional states . . . continue to live with the traditional rules—
by disingenuously evading them through trite and transparent escape devices.”); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of
Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 1001–02
(1994) (explaining that, because the traditional approach did not produce predictability and ease of
administration, courts developed escape devices, including the public policy exception).
75 Rauton v. Pullman Co., 191 S.E. 416, 422 (S.C. 1937) (internal quotation mark omitted). For the most
celebrated expression of the public policy exception, see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02
(N.Y. 1918) (“We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal
with it otherwise at home. . . . The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the
judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal.”).
76 A state has a governmental interest if it has “(a) a governmental policy and (b) a concurrent
relationship with the parties, the events, or the litigation such as to provide a reasonable basis for application of
the policy.” BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 737 (1963). Because interests
flow out of relationships, this approach overlaps with the majority approach.
77 See id. at 177–87; see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 949, 952–56 (1994).
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legitimate policy that would be advanced by application of its law.78 If so, then
they typically will apply forum law, whether or not another jurisdiction has a
legitimate interest in the dispute.79
In practice, the governmental interest approach has at least two major
variants. The lexi fori version, adopted by Kentucky and Michigan, gives
presumptive weight to the forum’s interests.80 The other version, adopted by
California and the District of Columbia, espouses an interest-balancing
approach without an explicit forum preference.81
The lex fori version applied in Kentucky and Michigan presumes that
forum law should apply unless there are valid reasons to do otherwise.82 As
long as the forum has “significant contacts—not necessarily the most
significant contacts”—forum law should apply.83 This presumption dictates the
outcome in most cases, unless the connection is simply too remote to justify
application of forum law.84 However, where the tort occurs in another country
and no party has a connection to the forum at the time of the tort, the
presumption typically is overcome, resulting in the application of foreign
law.85
78

See CURRIE, supra note 76, at 183–84.
See id.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 82–85.
81 See infra text accompanying notes 86–89.
82 See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) (“When the court has jurisdiction of the parties
its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.”); Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd.,
562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997) (“[W]e will apply Michigan law unless a ‘rational reason’ to do otherwise
exists.”); see also Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113–14 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259, 260 (Ky. 1967).
83 Foster, 484 S.W.2d at 829; see also Brewster v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 279 S.W.3d 142, 145 & n.8
(Ky. 2009) (applying Kentucky law because of significant contacts with Kentucky even though contacts with
other jurisdictions were more significant); Bonnlander v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1996) (explaining that courts applying Kentucky’s choice-of-law rule found that “any significant contact
with Kentucky was sufficient to allow Kentucky law to be applied”), abrogated by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33 (Ky. 2004) and Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 990 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1999).
Michigan courts are less explicit in their preference for forum law, stating that courts should “apply the law of
the forum unless important policy considerations dictate otherwise.” Sutherland, 562 N.W.2d at 470–71; see
Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 304 (Mich. 1987); see also Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., 322 F. Supp.
2d 848, 874–76 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Marks v. W. Side Unlimited Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 716, 718–21 (E.D.
Mich. 1999).
84 See Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1998); Custom Prods., Inc. v. Fluor Daniel
Can., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 767, 771 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Radeljak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 719 N.W.2d 40, 46
(Mich. 2006) (per curiam); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
85 See McGinnis v. Taitano, 3 F. Supp. 2d 767, 768–69 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (explaining where a tort
occurred in Germany and the tortfeasor moved to Kentucky after the tort occurred, lex loci delicti, rather than
lex fori, applied to the dispute); cf. Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789, 792 (W.D.
79
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The other variant engages in explicit interest balancing. Under California’s
comparative impairment approach, courts consider whether there is a true
conflict between affected states and apply “the law of the state whose interest
would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.”86 Courts favor forum
law when (1) the forum has an interest in the dispute and the laws of other
affected jurisdictions are not different or (2) when the laws are different and
the interests of the forum would be more impaired than the interests of the
other jurisdiction.87 Similarly, the District of Columbia applies forum law
when the forum has an interest in the dispute and the foreign state does not
have a greater interest in the controversy.88 The focus of both is not which law
manifests the “‘better’ or the ‘worthier’ social policy,” but rather “‘which
state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the
policy of the other state.’”89
Under either variant, courts have officially eschewed a strict preference for
forum law. The lex fori approach requires more than a passing interest, while
the comparative impairment approach will apply forum law only if the forum’s
interests are greater than the interests of other relevant jurisdictions. Of course,
the primacy to be given any particular interest at any particular time is ad hoc
and idiosyncratic. The forum court is free to subjectively identify and compare
governmental interests and base those interests on virtually any nexus to the
forum.90 Moreover, in many cases “false conflicts” will result in the
Ky. 1996) (finding that Kentucky had a minimal interest in the dispute between the non-domiciliary plaintiff
and defendant arising from an accident that occurred in Indiana), aff’d mem., 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998).
86 Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah’s
Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See id. (“[T]he governmental interest approach generally involves three steps. First, the court
determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions . . . is the same or
different. Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest . . . to determine
whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and
compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction . . . and then ultimately applies ‘the law of
the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.’” (quoting Bernhard, 546 P.2d
at 723)); see also Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 669–74 (Cal. 1974). Conversely, courts will apply
the law of the other affected jurisdiction if that law is different from California law and its interest would be
comparatively more impaired. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729–31 (Cal. 1967).
88 See Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty., 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Air Crash Disaster near
Saigon, S. Viet. on Apr. 4, 1975, 476 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.D.C. 1979); Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health
Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509 (D.C. 1985); Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5–6 (D.C. 1978).
89 McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 533 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922).
90 See, e.g., Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 469–70 (Mich. 1997)
(“[C]ourts may not be doing what they purport to do, that is, employing the modern choice-of-law theories in a
neutral way to determine what law applies. Rather, . . . courts employing the new theories have a very strong
preference for forum law that frequently causes them to manipulate the theories so that they end up applying
forum law.”); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that, in
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application of forum law.91 The practical result is the frequent application of
forum law.
D. Third Minority Approach: The Better Law
The third minority approach focuses on preferred outcomes, pursuing the
better law to achieve individual justice in particularized cases.92 This approach
allows courts in these jurisdictions to avoid archaic and unfair laws by
choosing the law that “make[s] good socio-economic sense for the time when
the court speaks.”93 The best way to achieve the right result is to choose the
right set of rules. As Robert Leflar put it, “[t]he urge to do justice in the
individual case is amply cared for by a wise choice of the better law to govern
the parties’ claims.”94
Courts occasionally downplay the search for the better law, concluding that
“[s]ometimes different laws are neither better nor worse in an objective way,
just different.”95 Moreover, courts routinely apply laws that do not achieve

cases involving foreign torts and forum domiciliary defendants, Michigan had no interest in affording greater
recoveries to the North Carolina residents than those afforded under the other jurisdiction’s law).
91 For a discussion of false conflicts, see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 64 (1965);
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 21
(2006); Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 881, 892–94 (2009); Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen
Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1177, 1188–89 (2005); and Peter Kay Westen, False Conflicts,
55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76–78 (1967).
92 This approach has been adopted in five jurisdictions: Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1.
93 Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584,
1588 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations]; see also Hughes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 2001); Klimstra v. Granstrom, 95 F.3d 686, 690–91 (8th Cir. 1996);
Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 1995); Bourgeois v. Vanderbilt, 639 F. Supp. 2d 958,
964 (W.D. Ark. 2009), aff’d, 417 F. App’x 605 (8th Cir. 2011); Med. Graphics Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
171 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D. Minn. 1997); Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 917, 923 (Ark. 2005);
Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Ark. 2002); Schlemmer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
730 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Ark. 1987); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith’s Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 457–58 (Ark. 1977);
Jepson v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Minn. 1994); Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 13
(Minn. 1981); Ferren v. Gen. Motors Corp. Delco Battery Div., 628 A.2d 265, 269 (N.H. 1993); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1195–97 (N.H. 1988); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 302 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations]. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas—The Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 28 ARK. L. REV. 199 (1974) (discussing “choice-influencing considerations,” including the
consideration of the “better law”).
94 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 302.
95 Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 473; see also Nesladek, 46 F.3d at 741; Kenna v. So-Fro Fabrics, Inc., 18 F.3d
623, 627 (8th Cir. 1994); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., 787 F. Supp. 1541, 1554 n.13 (D. Minn. 1992).
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individualized justice when other considerations are weighed in the balance.96
Thus, where an American citizen domiciled in the United States is injured by a
Brazilian airline on a flight in Brazil, concerns for the maintenance of
international order ordinarily will trump a state court’s conclusion that forum
law is superior.97 As such, “better law” approaches incorporate themes present
in other approaches, often resembling the majority or eclectic approaches.
The “better law” approach allows courts to identify and apply emerging
trends and forgo the application of laws that are in decline.98 Courts—
particularly lower state courts or federal courts applying state law—can do
justice in the individual case and nod in the direction of change without
actually changing the common law.99 This approach strikes a middle path
between ossified rules and boundless principles, giving courts a narrow
window to pursue justice within the confines of the best available laws.100
E. Fourth Minority Approach: Eclecticism
The final minority approach is an eclectic one that combines previous
approaches in various permutations.101 The most notable example of this
eclectic approach is New York’s choice-of-law analysis, which is a factintensive examination of governmental interests and significant contacts. As
articulated in Neumeier v. Kuehner, New York courts divide torts into cases of

96 Other “choice-influencing” factors include “A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate
and international order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; [and] D. Advancement of the forum’s
governmental interests.” Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282; see also, e.g.,
Klimstra, 95 F.3d at 690–91; Gomez, 71 S.W.3d at 548; Ferren, 628 A.2d at 269.
97 See Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 1596–98 (“The forum court
probably will not really prefer Brazil’s law, but the balance of considerations will nevertheless impel it to
apply the disliked law.”).
98 See Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 204 N.W.2d 897, 906 (Wis. 1973).
99 See Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.R.I. 1972) (deciding, under Rhode Island’s
“better law” approach, to apply Illinois law to recognize the emerging tort of invasion of privacy because such
a tort “[was] destined for universal recognition” because it was “founded in the most basic concepts of human
rights”).
100 See Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Wis. 1967) (holding that in adopting the “better law”
approach, the court is “obliged to avoid those that represent the Scylla of new jurisdiction selecting rules and
the Charybdis of those whose latitude is so boundless as to be no guide at all. The latter, while philosophically
sound, are of little help to the busy judge or lawyer, and the former, though tranquilizing in their assuring
certainty, are perilously close to the ossified rules of lex loci that we have so recently rejected”).
101 Six jurisdictions—Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—embrace
a combined modern approach that incorporates elements of the other approaches. See Symeonides, supra note
47, at 309 tbl.1.
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common and split domiciles.102 When the parties have the same domicile, the
court pronounces a categorical rule that the law of the common domicile
should control the outcome of the case.103 Where the plaintiff and defendant
have different domiciles, however, the center of gravity shifts and the courts
apply a presumption favoring lex loci delicti, which may be overcome by
balancing various governmental interests.104 Grafted onto this territorial
presumption and interest analysis is a public policy escape, which may
preclude enforcement of foreign law where the forum has sufficient interest in
the outcome of the case.105
In practice, the Neumeier approach means that, with split domiciles, the
locus of the tort and resulting injury is presumptively appropriate, but courts
can pick and choose among available governmental interests as well as New
York public policy to apply a different law.106 In the international human rights
context, courts applying this eclectic approach will rarely encounter common
domiciliaries committing wrongful conduct outside their common jurisdiction.
Most human rights cases default to Neumeier rules that presume lex loci
delicti.
Having briefly summarized these six distinctive choice-of-law approaches,
the next Part examines notable instances in which these approaches have been
applied in the international terrorism context. The success of transnational tort
102

See 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972); see also Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
184 (3d Cir. 2000); Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., 952 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (N.Y. 2011); Cooney v. Osgood
Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1993); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y.
1985).
103 See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457 (“When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the
same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of
care which the host owes to his guest.” (quoting Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld,
C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
104 See id. at 457–58 (“2. When the driver’s conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability
would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim’s domicile. Conversely, when the
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into
that state should not—in the absence of special circumstances—be permitted to interpose the law of his state as
a defense. 3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is
necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or
producing great uncertainty for litigants.” (quoting Tooker, 249 N.E.2d at 404) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
105 See Edwards, 952 N.E.2d at 1043–44; Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687–88.
106 See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687–89. For an instance in which application of New York public policy
controlled the result, see Begley v. City of New York, 878 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
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law to resolve international terrorism cases portends the likelihood of similar
success with respect to other human rights claims. If international terrorism
can be treated as garden-variety torts, there is nothing to prevent human rights
victims of other international violations from following the example.
III. TERRORIST ATTACKS AS TRANSNATIONAL TORTS
The most notable example of the application of choice-of-law principles to
the human rights context is with respect to international terrorism. These cases
illustrate the different choice-of-law approaches, and how those approaches
have applied domestic and foreign tort laws to secure dozens of successful
judgments.
This Part begins with a detailed analysis of the District of Columbia’s
choice-of-law approach in resolving dozens of international terrorism cases.
The governmental interests at stake with international terrorism invariably
dictate the choice of applicable law. It then contrasts that approach with New
York’s eclectic approach.
The terrorism cases are unusual in that the vast majority have been
adjudicated in either the District of Columbia or New York, thereby limiting
the analysis to two minority approaches. They also are unusual in that the
governmental interests at stake are paramount and unlikely to be replicated
with other human rights claims. Nonetheless, these cases exemplify the
efficacy of using choice-of-law analysis and garden-variety tort laws to redress
grave human rights abuses.
A. Terrorism and the Governmental Interest Analysis
In the past fifteen years, federal courts in the District of Columbia have
applied the governmental interest analysis to award billions of dollars to
victims of terrorism.107 They typically have done so by invoking choice-of-law
107 See infra note 176 and accompanying text. While most of these cases resulted in default judgments,
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s terrorism exception, “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered
by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2012); see also Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 838–39 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d
1, 6 (D.D.C. 2011); Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009). Plaintiffs have
the burden of establishing all elements of their claim and courts must consider all relevant defenses. Although
Iran often does not appear as a defendant, claims have been dismissed in a number of these cases. See, e.g.,
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 359 (D.D.C. 2006).
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principles to apply domestic tort law to redress foreign terrorist attacks. In
most cases, the state tort law of the decedents’ domicile has controlled. Thus,
when a suicide bomber kills Americans in Israel, Lebanon, or Nigeria, it is
Illinois, Louisiana, or Nebraska law that is applied to hold the perpetrators
accountable.
The catalyst for terrorism litigation was a federal statute permitting civil
suits against state sponsors of terrorism when that terrorism causes personal
injury or death “by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an
act.”108 Another statute—the “Flatow Amendment”—conferred a private right
of action against any official, employee, or agent of a state sponsor of
terrorism.109 These statutes were a watershed moment, creating the first human
rights exception to sovereign immunity, thereby removing the most important
impediment to successful litigation against state sponsors of terrorism.
For years, federal courts assumed that these statutes created a federal cause
of action.110 In 2004, the D.C. Circuit in Cicippio-Puelo v. Islamic Republic of
Iran found that the amendment “merely waives the immunity of a foreign state
without creating a cause of action against it.”111 The court went further and
held that “action[s] against officials, employees, and agents of foreign
states . . . [were] limited to claims against those officials in their individual, as
opposed to their official, capacities.”112 Having found that federal law only
waived immunity and granted jurisdiction against the state, the court remanded
the case “to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to state a
cause of action under some other source of law, including state law.”113

108

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (repealed 2008).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2012); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269
(D.D.C. 2003).
110 See, e.g., Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269; Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell I),
281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 193 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005); Regier v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (D.D.C. 2003), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, as recognized in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2003), abrogated by
Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024; Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230–31 (D.D.C.
2002), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024.
111 353 F.3d at 1033.
112 Id. at 1034.
113 Id. at 1033, 1036.
109
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Several months later, the D.C. Circuit in Acree v. Republic of Iraq clarified
the Cicippio-Puleo ruling, emphasizing that pleading “generic common law
torts,” such as assault and battery or wrongful death, was insufficient, and that
a plaintiff “must identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific
source of law.”114
Following Cicippio-Puleo and Acree, claimants in dozens of cases
amended their complaints to plead violations of state or federal law. The
federal law claims were unsuccessful because courts could not apply relevant
federal statutes115 and were reluctant to create federal common law tort
claims.116 The only viable alternative was to invoke choice-of-law principles
and apply state or foreign tort law.
The first decision following Cicippio-Puleo and Acree to address this
choice-of-law question arose out of the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut, Lebanon, the first large-scale terrorist attack against the United States.
In Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, over eighty U.S. citizens sued Iran
and the Iranian intelligence agency for their role in the embassy bombing.117
The court applied the District of Columbia’s governmental interest analysis to
determine whether to apply District of Columbia, Lebanese, or plaintiffs’
domiciliary law.118 Among those options, the court concluded that the interests
114 Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004), abrogated by Republic of Iraq v. Beaty,
556 U.S. 848 (2009).
115 The ATS foreclosed American claims and the Torture Victim Protection Act foreclosed claims against
sovereign defendants. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d
1, 17–19 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
116 See, e.g., Holland, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 19–20.
117 See Dammarell II, No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 756090, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005); see also
Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell III), 370 F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (D.D.C. 2005); Dammarell
v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell IV), 404 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270 (D.D.C. 2005). The original Dammarell
decision was rendered before, and vacated by, Dammarell IV. See Dammarell I, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C.
2003), vacated, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261. Dammarell II was an unpublished opinion, but its reasoning was
expressly adopted in Dammarell III, Dammarell IV, and several other published opinions. See, e.g., Nikbin v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (D.D.C. 2007); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D.D.C. 2007); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 54 (D.D.C. 2006);
Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2006); Bodoff v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2006); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F. Supp. 2d
152, 159 (D.D.C. 2006); Holland, 496 F. Supp. at 23–24; Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 132–33 (D.D.C. 2005); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113–14
(D.D.C. 2005).
118 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *18. While the District of Columbia has adopted a
governmental interest approach, courts often add a “most significant relationship” gloss to the governmental
interest analysis. See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007)
(quoting Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 & n.18 (D.C. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
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of the domiciliary state should prevail.119 The District of Columbia had little
interest in the case, the court reasoned, with almost all of the plaintiffs residing
outside the District of Columbia, the attack occurring overseas, and the
defendants having no particular connection with the forum.120 As between
Lebanese law and domiciliary law, the court had to balance “the strong and
recognized interest of the domicile state in ensuring that its citizens are
compensated for harm, and the intrinsic interest of the lex loci in deterring
attacks within its jurisdiction.”121 The governmental interests at stake in the
terrorist attack were decisive:
[T]he particular characteristics of this case heighten the interests of a
domestic forum and diminish the interest of the foreign state. The
injuries in this case are the result of a state-sponsored terrorist attack
on a United States embassy and diplomatic personnel. The United
States has a unique interest in its domestic law, rather than the law of
a foreign nation, determining damages in a suit involving such an
attack. . . . [T]hese considerations . . . elevate the interests of the
United States to nearly its highest point. . . . In the circumstances of
this case . . . domestic law, and not the law of Lebanon, should
122
control.

Other courts have followed Dammarell’s reasoning, emphasizing that statesponsored terrorism that targets U.S. citizens raises paramount governmental
interests.123 These courts justify the projection of state tort law overseas based
on the protective principle of international law, which authorizes the

omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1995). The law of the
defendants’ domicile was not considered. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19. As to the possible
application of Iranian law, see Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 439 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (“It
is implausible to conclude that Congress would have passed § 1605(a)(7) to grant jurisdiction to federal courts
over foreign . . . state sponsors of terrorism, only to require application of the law of such states . . . .”).
119 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19–20.
120 Id. at *19. Other courts depart from this reasoning and conclude that, while the District of Columbia
shares with other U.S. jurisdictions concerns about protecting the United States’ interests abroad, the
jurisdiction with the most significant interest is the plaintiff’s state of domicile. Reed, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
121 Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19.
122 Id. at *20.
123 See, e.g., Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200, 210 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he
law of the United States applies rather than the law of the place of the tort or any other foreign law. This is
because the United States has a ‘unique interest’ in having its domestic law apply in cases involving terrorist
attacks on United States citizens.”); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 384 F. Supp. 2d 120,
133 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Like the embassy bombings that gave rise to the claims in Dammerell [sic], the statesponsored torturing of plaintiffs . . . is the kind of harm that the United States has a state interest in
discouraging.”).
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extraterritorial application of laws to redress the foreign conduct of foreign
nationals directed against the state.124
There are several important aspects of these decisions. First, application of
the District of Columbia’s governmental interest analysis is unusually
complex. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has emphasized, its
choice-of-law analysis is a modified governmental interest approach.125 That
approach uses the governmental interest analysis but presumes that the
jurisdiction whose policy would be most advanced by application of its law
will be the forum with the most significant relationship.126 With a terrorist
attack, almost all of the contacts point toward the application of foreign law:
the defendants are domiciled abroad, the injury and conduct occurred abroad,
and the parties’ relationship is centered there. Thus, to the extent the most
significant relationship is a gloss on the governmental interest analysis, one
would think it would have received greater attention. This is particularly so in
some contexts, such as terrorist attacks in Israel, when the interests of the lex
loci in combating terrorism are aligned with the interests of the United
States.127
Second, in the typical domestic context, choice of law requires balancing
the competing governmental interests of the several states. In these cases, by
contrast, the courts compare the United States’ interests in applying domestic
law with a foreign state’s interest in applying its law. The paramount
governmental interest of the United States controls the choice-of-law
outcome.128 The courts aggregate the national interests rather than the
individualized interests of the several states, and conclude that those interests
prevail over competing foreign interests. As one court noted, each of the
several states is “part of a larger jurisdiction—the United States—and share its
interests in an internationally-oriented choice-of-law analysis.”129 This
124 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 402(3) (1987)); see also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 266 (D.D.C.
2006); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 398 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 n.6 (D.D.C. 2005); Price, 384 F. Supp. 2d at
133.
125 See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007); District of
Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1995); Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31,
40–41 (D.C. 1989).
126 Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, 917 A.2d at 1117; Hercules, 566 A.2d at 41.
127 See generally, e.g., Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving a
suicide bombing of a bus in Jerusalem); Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C.
2006) (involving a suicide bombing in a restaurant in Jerusalem).
128 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *20.
129 Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 439 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66 (D.D.C. 2006).
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approach would suggest that choice of law in the international context may
require a different governmental interest analysis than that applied in the
domestic context, on the theory that state tort laws are designed to protect
national interests from foreign threats.
Third, if the paramount governmental interest is to prevent terrorism
directed against the United States, one would think courts would distinguish
between terrorist attacks directed at U.S. targets from other attacks.130 Yet for
years courts rarely distinguished between the two, applying domiciliary state
tort law in cases involving terrorist attacks targeting the United States,131 as
well as terrorist attacks targeting other countries such as Lebanon,132 France,133
or Turkey.134
Courts finally began to recognize this distinction in 2008, concluding that
foreign law should apply in the absence of a U.S. nexus.135 For example, the

130

This is not to suggest there are no American interests at stake in such attacks. Courts could apply
domestic tort law in such cases based on the “passive personality principle” that authorizes the regulation of
foreign acts by foreign nationals that injure American nationals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987).
131 See generally, e.g., Beer, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (applying Virginia and Ohio law to claims arising from a
Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 575 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C.
2008) (applying Missouri law to claims arising from the bombing of a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia);
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying state law to claims
arising from the bombing of a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia); Greenbaum, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (applying
New Jersey and California law to claims arising from a restaurant bombing in Jerusalem).
132 See generally, e.g., Dammarell IV, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying domiciliary state law
to claims involving a vehicle explosion at a U.S. embassy in Lebanon); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
370 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Illinois tort law to claims arising from an embassy bombing in
Lebanon).
133 See generally, e.g., Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting,
under domiciliary state tort law, damages following the assassination of an Iranian dissident in Paris).
134 See generally, e.g., Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 398 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying
domiciliary state tort law to claims arising from the torture of tourists in Turkey to harm Turkish tourism,
embarrass the Turkish government, and lure Turkish personnel into ambush).
135 See, e.g., Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Estate of Botvin ex
rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he court declined to give
dispositive weight to the victim’s nationality, as the plaintiffs and victim were domiciled in Israel at the time of
the attacks, the attacks occurred in Israel, California’s interest arose solely from the fact that the plaintiff was
born and briefly resided there and the plaintiffs had produced ‘no evidence that the terrorist attack was targeted
specifically at U.S. nationals or was otherwise intended to affect the United States.’”); Wachsman ex rel.
Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he United States has a
unique interest in applying its own law . . . to determine liability involved in a state-sponsored terrorist attack
on one of its citizens, particularly when such an attack is directed against its national interests. . . . But with
respect to wrongful death claims, Israel has a unique interest as well. . . . Here, the decedent suffered injury
and death in Israel and lived his entire life in Israel. Thus, whether this court applies the law where decedent
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D.C. Circuit in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran concluded that where (1) the
victim assassinated in Paris was not an American national, (2) the object of the
attack was an Iranian dissident living in France, (3) there was no evidence that
the defendants knew the victim had any American connections, and (4) there
was no evidence that the defendants were targeting the United States, “all of
the relevant choice-of-law factors point to the application of French law to the
plaintiff’s claims.”136
Finally, this analysis begs the question of which law should apply when
terrorist attacks target the United States but the victims are foreign nationals.
Beginning in 2011, federal courts addressing cases involving attacks on U.S.
embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, and Tanzania applied District of Columbia
choice-of-law principles and concluded that forum law should govern.137
Several arguments supported this conclusion.138 First, there was no “true
conflict” between District of Columbia law and the laws of Lebanon, Kenya,
and Tanzania, permitting the application of forum law.139 Second, where an
attack targets U.S. embassies, the United States has a “unique interest” in
having domestic law instead of foreign law apply.140 Third, the interests of
was domiciled at the time of his death, or the state where the injuries leading to death occurred, the law of
Israel applies.” (citations omitted)).
136 Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 843.
137 See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 154–57 (D.D.C. 2011) (involving attacks
in Kenya and Tanzania); Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2011)
(involving an attack in Lebanon). In 2008, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
provide a cause of action for U.S. nationals and certain foreign nationals who were employees of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2) (2012); see also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d
20, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 58–60
(D.D.C. 2009); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 646 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2011). Some plaintiffs, such as foreign-national family members of victims, fell outside the scope of this
new federal cause of action and therefore continued to pursue state tort claims. See Leibovitch v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Israeli law to a suit brought by the
foreign-national family members of a U.S. citizen arising from a terrorist attack in Israel); Owens, 826 F.
Supp. 2d at 151–53; Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
138 Many of these same arguments could be applied to claims brought by U.S. nationals in cases such as
Dammarell, with the result that District of Columbia tort law could have been applied as the rule of decision in
those cases as well.
139 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55 (“[N]o clear conflict of law is present between the laws of the
forum (District of Columbia) and the laws of Kenya and Tanzania.”); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20–21
(“[N]o clear conflict of law is present between the forum (District of Columbia) and Lebanon.”).
140 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (“The United States has a unique interest in its domestic law, rather
than the law of a foreign nation, determining damages in a suit involving such an attack [on a U.S. embassy].”
(quoting Dammarell II, No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (“[T]he ‘governmental interest’ prong of the
District of Columbia choice of law analysis counsels against applying the law of Lebanon, or other foreign
laws, and suggests that domestic law should control.”).
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uniformity and efficiency supported reliance on forum law over the
domiciliary laws of the foreign nationals.141 Finally, a “unifying factor”
favoring the application of forum law was that “all of plaintiffs’ claims derive
from employment with a federal agency headquartered in the District of
Columbia, the seat of the federal government.”142
In sum, courts applying the District of Columbia’s modified governmental
interest analysis have reached three distinct results. While these are not
categorical rules,143 Table 1 below represents the general parameters of the
District of Columbia’s terrorism choice-of-law jurisprudence. First, with
respect to U.S. nationals, courts apply the state tort law of the plaintiff’s
domiciliary, whether or not an attack targeted the United States.144 Second,
courts apply forum law to foreign national claims arising from a terrorist attack
targeting the United States. Third, courts apply foreign law to foreign national
claims arising from an attack targeting other countries.

141 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (“[A]pplying District of Columbia law will provide greater
uniformity of result, as individual plaintiffs domiciled in different states and foreign nations will all be subject
to the same substantive law.”); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 22–23 (“[T]he interests of uniformity of
decision among the foreign national family members points to the application of the law of the forum. . . .
[E]fficiency and uniformity are appropriate and meaningful factors in a choice of law analysis.”).
142 Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 156; Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
143 Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D.D.C. 2011).
144 If a U.S. national does not have a U.S. domicile, courts have occasionally applied forum law, see BenRafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 54 (D.D.C. 2008); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2006), and have occasionally applied foreign domiciliary law, see Botvin, 772
F. Supp. 2d at 223–26; Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96
(D.D.C. 2008).
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Table 1
UNITED STATES
NATIONAL

FOREIGN
NATIONAL

ATTACK
TARGETING
UNITED STATES

PLAINTIFF
DOMICILIARY LAW

FORUM LAW

ATTACK
TARGETING
OTHER
COUNTRIES

PLAINTIFF
DOMICILIARY LAW

FOREIGN LAW

B. Terrorism and the Eclectic Approach
The District of Columbia’s approach is the most important example for
choice-of-law principles applied to adjudicate international terrorism. There
are, however, a few terrorism cases that have been filed elsewhere, particularly
New York, and these cases offer a useful prism for examining how other courts
have resolved terrorism cases using other choice-of-law approaches.
The most sophisticated application of New York choice of law in the
terrorism context arose from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland.145 In the case of Pescatore v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., the Second Circuit had numerous laws to choose from in
resolving the dispute: (1) Pan Am’s improper screening of luggage occurred in
Germany or England, (2) the crash and resulting deaths occurred in Scotland,
(3) the defendant was domiciled in New York, and (4) the plaintiff and
decedent were domiciled in Ohio.146 It thus presented an ideal laboratory for
testing New York’s choice-of-law approach in the terrorism context.
145
146

See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 13–14.
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Applying New York’s eclectic approach, the Second Circuit recognized
that where the injured party and the defendant had split domiciles “and the
accident occurred in a third jurisdiction, the law of the place of the accident
presumptively applie[d].”147 But citing Babcock v. Jackson, the court
concluded that this presumption made no sense where “the place of the crash is
often random . . . and the sovereignty in which the accident occurs has little
interest in applying its substantive law to the case.”148 This is particularly so
when the question was one of allocating loss rather than the regulation of
conduct. “[W]here no negligence or misconduct took place in Scotland, and
where no damages were incurred in Scotland, there is really no reason . . . why
the compensability of the plaintiff’s damages should be governed by Scottish
law.”149
As between New York and Ohio law, the Second Circuit concluded that
both jurisdictions had an interest in the case, but Ohio’s interests were
greater.150 New York’s interest in limiting a New York corporation’s financial
exposure was not significant in this case given an applicable federal law
prohibiting punitive damages.151 Ohio had an obvious interest in ensuring that
its residents were fully and adequately compensated for tortious harm—loss of
society, loss of financial support, and loss of services—occurring in Ohio.
Applying New York’s choice of law, Ohio tort law therefore governed.152
A different analysis applied where the concern was to regulate conduct
instead of allocate losses. In Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank,
SAL, the Second Circuit addressed claims that American Express Bank Ltd., a
correspondent bank of Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, provided wire transfer
services to Hezbollah that facilitated the financing of terrorism in Israel.153
Applying New York choice-of-law principles, the Second Circuit concluded
that it should “give controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
147

Id. at 13 (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972)).
Id. (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1963)) (noting the “place of accident has little
interest where it was a ‘purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there’” (quoting Babcock,
191 N.E.2d at 284)).
149 Id. at 14. Neither German nor English law was applied because those jurisdictions were not the “place
of the wrong,” which is determined by considering the last event necessary to make the actor liable, namely
the injuries in Scotland. See id. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id. at 14 (finding Ohio’s “important and obvious interest in ensuring that its residents are fully and
adequately compensated for tortious harm” outweighed New York’s minimal “interest in regulating the extent
to which New York-centered corporations may be held liable for excessive or punitive damages”).
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See 672 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2012).
148
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because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”154 Under New
York’s eclectic approach, the court concluded that New York had the greatest
interest in the litigation.
All of the challenged conduct undertaken by AmEx occurred in New
York, where AmEx is headquartered and where AmEx administers its
correspondent banking services. Although the plaintiffs’ injuries
occurred in Israel, and Israel is also the plaintiffs’ domicile, those
factors do not govern where, as here, the conflict pertains to a
155
conduct-regulating rule.

Lower courts have followed suit. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., a federal
district court addressed a Chinese bank’s alleged financing of terrorism in
Israel.156 Relying on Licci, the district court concluded that Chinese law should
be applied to resolve the dispute. Because under Licci it is the locus of
defendant’s conduct and not the locus of injury that controls, the court
concluded that “China’s interest in regulating bank conduct within its borders
is dispositive.”157
Licci and Wultz are in tension with other cases applying New York choice
of law to resolve claims against owners and operators of the Twin Towers
arising from the September 11 terrorist attacks.158 The court concluded “that
the state in which the tort took place ha[d] the strongest interest in applying its
conduct-regulating rules.”159 New York law governed the question of whether
owners negligently designed and maintained the Twin Towers because “New
York ha[d] the strongest interest in applying its substantive law to define the
issues of duty, proximate causation, and governmental immunity.”160

154

Id. at 158 (quoting Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155 Id. at 158.
156 See 865 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
157 Id. at 429. The court noted that the locus of injury may still control in the absence of a third party’s
intervening criminal act. See id. at 429 n.28.
158 See In re September 11 Litig. (September 11th Litig. I), 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
court did not exclusively apply the forum’s choice of law because federal law consolidated September 11
litigation in New York but mandated that the substantive law “be derived from the law, including choice of
law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred.” See id. at 287–89 (quoting Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
159 Id. at 289.
160 Id. at 299.
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In a subsequent ruling in the same case, the court applied New York choice
of law to determine whether punitive damages were available against the
airline carriers and security screening companies.161 The court concluded that
New York’s interests were predominant:
New York was the target of the terrorists. As long as it remains the
commercial center of . . . the world, New York will be a target for
terrorists. . . . The attack on the World Trade Center was an attack on
the City of New York, the State of New York, and the United
States . . . New York . . . has the greatest interest in applying its
162
conduct-regulating law.

Thus, although New York’s conduct-regulating choice-of-law analysis
ordinarily might point to the application of Massachusetts law (where the
defendants failed to properly screen the terrorists), the court concluded that
New York’s interests in combatting terrorism prevailed over any other
governmental interest.163
C. Terrorism and Various Other Approaches
Beyond the District of Columbia and New York, there have been a small
handful of other cases that hint at how other jurisdictions might resolve
terrorism cases. A federal court applying Virginia choice of law to the
September 11 attacks on the Pentagon concluded without analysis that Virginia
tort law should govern claims arising from the crash of American Flight 77
into the Pentagon.164 Although offering little analysis, the result comports with
Virginia’s traditional lex loci delicti reasoning, focusing on the place of injury
as the last event necessary to render the defendants liable.
With respect to Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law approach, the court in an
early September 11 case focused on “the substantive law of the state having the
most interest in the outcome of the case.”165 Applying that standard led the
161

See In re September 11th Litig. (September 11th Litig. II), 494 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 239–40. It is not clear that a choice between the law of the place of the wrong (Massachusetts)
and the place of the injury (New York) was necessary, given that neither jurisdiction allowed for punitive
damages in this circumstance. See id.; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 255 (2008). It appears, however, that the court
was comparing not simply those two jurisdictions, but also the various jurisdictions where the plaintiffs and
defendants were domiciled. See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
163 See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
164 See September 11th Litig. I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 290, 305; see also September 11th Litig. II, 494 F.
Supp. 2d at 240.
165 September 11th Litig. I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
162
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court to rely on Pennsylvania tort law to resolve claims relating to the crash of
United 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.166
In a subsequent case applying Pennsylvania choice of law to the question of
whether compensatory damages were available, the court concluded that the
law of the plaintiffs’ domicile should apply.167 Pennsylvania law should not
govern that question because the location of the crash of United 93 was wholly
“fortuitous.”168 While the defendants’ domicile had an interest in maintaining
the health and vitality of its companies and protecting those companies from
undue and unpredictable liability, the court concluded that the governmental
interest of the plaintiffs’ domiciliary was predominant: “The interest of a
plaintiff’s domicile state in protecting the well-being of surviving dependents
will be fully vindicated by application of its own law.”169
Jurisdictions that apply the most significant relationship test have addressed
a handful of terrorism cases. That test was applied in three terrorism cases
arising in Florida and Illinois.170 In Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Seventh Circuit applying Illinois choice of law concluded that Israeli law
should govern Israeli national claims against Iran for terrorism occurring in
Israel.171 In In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc. and Saludes v. Republica
de Cuba, federal courts in Florida concluded that the plaintiffs’ domiciliary
law (Nebraska and Florida) should apply to claims of alleged Colombian and
Cuban terrorism in Colombia and Cuba.172 Finally, in Estates of Ungar ex rel.
Strachman v. Palestinian Authority a federal court in Rhode Island applying
Rhode Island choice of law concluded that Israeli law should resolve claims
involving terrorist attacks in Israel against American nationals domiciled in
Israel.173 Although a “better law” jurisdiction, the court did not address which

166

Id.
See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 241. There was no true conflict regarding the
availability of punitive damages among the jurisdictions with an interest in regulating defendants’ conduct. See
id. at 241–42.
168 Id. at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id.
170 See Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 570–73 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1315–17 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 1243, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
171 See Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 570–73.
172 See In re Chiquita Brands, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1315–17; Saludes, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
173 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82, 98–99 (D.R.I. 2001). After amending the complaint to incorporate Israeli law
claims, the court subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had asserted valid claims under Israeli law for,
inter alia, negligence, assault, and various statutory violations. Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v.
Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47–48 (D.R.I. 2002).
167
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jurisdiction had the better law, or whether other “choice-influencing
considerations” would have altered the result.174
Summarizing the approaches applied by other choice-of-law jurisdictions,
these cases suggest that courts apply the lex loci delicti presumption subject to
several caveats. Courts will apply plaintiffs’ domiciliary law if the location of
the attack was fortuitous or if the terrorism occurred in a jurisdiction complicit
in the attack.175 With respect to conduct-regulating rules, courts in New York
ordinarily will apply the law of the place of wrongful conduct, but will apply
the law of the place of injury if New York was the target of the attack. Finally,
it remains unclear whether these courts will apply the lex loci delicti
presumption to foreign terrorist attacks targeting the United States.
The complexity inherent in applying these choice-of-law approaches to
international terrorism does not alter the simplicity of the central idea: grave
human rights abuses have been litigated in domestic courts using conventional
tort laws. The same approach is available for human rights abuses that
heretofore have been resolved through ATS litigation.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS TRANSNATIONAL TORTS
Recourse to state or foreign tort law has led courts to award billions of
dollars in judgments to victims of terrorism.176 With the demise of the ATS
and the success of terrorism litigation, this Article posits that the time is ripe to
reframe human rights violations as transnational torts. If so, how should choice
of law be undertaken in the human rights context? This Part analyzes that
question by considering how the divergent approaches might resolve choiceof-law questions in notable human rights cases.

174 A proper analysis of Rhode Island choice of law also would have considered Leflar’s “choiceinfluencing considerations”: “A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task; D. Advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; [and] E.
Application of the better rule of law.” Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282; see
Victoria v. Smythe, 703 A.2d 619, 620–21 (R.I. 1997); Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997).
175 This conclusion can only be inferred from Saludes and In re Chiquita Brands, because neither decision
explains why it applied plaintiff domiciliary law instead of Cuban or Colombian law.
176 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing a
multibillion dollar judgment against Iran); In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31,
37 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing “10 billion dollars in currently outstanding” terrorism judgments against Iran);
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CV 11-80065 MISC CRB (NJV), 2011 WL 3157089, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
July 26, 2011) (reporting a “staggering 9.6 billion dollars in outstanding judgments entered against Iran in
terrorism cases as of August 2008”).
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A. Human Rights Test Cases
To test how choice-of-law questions might be resolved in other human
rights contexts, we will apply the divergent approaches outlined in Part II to
the facts of well-known human rights cases. These cases were chosen based on
their particular nexus to the United States. Each scenario highlights how,
depending on the circumstances, different choice-of-law approaches would
result in the application of foreign or state tort law.
1. No Nexus. The first scenario arises from the facts alleged in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., discussed above. Nigerian victims alleged human
rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, and crimes against
humanity, perpetrated in Nigeria by the Nigerian government with the aid and
assistance of non-American corporate defendants.177 The Kiobel scenario
assumes no connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign plaintiffs, foreign
defendants, foreign misconduct, foreign injury, foreign governmental interests,
and little or no forum interests at stake in the outcome of the proceedings.178
2. After-Acquired Plaintiff Nexus. The second scenario arises from the facts
alleged in Licea v. Curaçao Drydock Co.179 Cuban nationals domiciled in
Florida alleged human rights abuses, including physical abuse, human
trafficking, and forced labor, perpetrated in Curaçao by a Curaçaoan corporate

177 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013). There is ambiguity as to the residency status of the Kiobel plaintiffs.
The case is a putative class action in which the named plaintiffs acquired U.S. residency after the alleged
human rights abuses occurred, but the unnamed plaintiffs apparently remain Nigerian residents. See id.; Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013). For purposes of this Article, we treat the plaintiffs’ status as nonresidents because that is the status of
the majority of the plaintiffs, and choice-of-law analysis must be applied to all members of a class action. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–23 (1985). See generally Linda Silberman, The Role of
Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008) (discussing how choice of law may
influence forum selection in putative class actions).
178 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. There are numerous ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063–64 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (noting that the defendants were foreign, with the exception of one corporate defendant, an
American subsidiary), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); Chowdhury v.
WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Roe I v. Bridgestone, 492 F.
Supp. 2d 988, 990–92 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (noting that the defendants were foreign, with the exception of one
corporate defendant, an American subsidiary); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
179 See 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2008); see also Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 870 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1362–63 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (S.D.
Fla. 2011); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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defendant.180 The Licea scenario assumes a plaintiff-based connection to a U.S.
forum, with foreign plaintiffs domiciled in the forum, a foreign defendant,
foreign misconduct, foreign injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the
outcome of the proceedings.181
3. Defendant Nexus/Deficient Law. The third scenario arises from the facts
alleged in Doe v. Unocal Corp.182 Burmese victims alleged human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced relocation,
perpetrated in Burma by the Burmese government with the aid and assistance
of an American corporation and its officers.183 The Unocal scenario assumes a
defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign plaintiffs, American
defendants, foreign misconduct, foreign injury, and both foreign and forum
interests in the outcome of the proceedings.184 The Unocal scenario further
assumes a foreign law that is seriously deficient or unknowable, and that
foreign governmental interests are illegitimate or contrary to traditional norms
for wrongful conduct applied by the community of nations.185
4. Defendant and Conduct Nexus. The fourth scenario arises from the facts
alleged in Abagninin v. Amvac Chemical Corp.186 Ivory Coast victims alleged
human rights abuses, including genocide and crimes against humanity,
perpetrated by American corporations by knowingly designing, developing,
180

Licea, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1362–63.
See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 850 F. Supp.
2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In some respects Kiobel fits this pattern because the named plaintiffs are
Nigerian refugees located in the United States. See supra text accompanying note 177. In other cases,
including well-known cases such as Hilao and Filartiga, both the plaintiffs and defendants acquired residency
in the United States after the torts occurred. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 791 (9th Cir. 1996);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
182 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936–97 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
183 See id.
184 There are numerous ATS cases that fit this pattern, at least with respect to a defendant-based nexus to
the United States. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated,
527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2009); Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir.
2002); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116
(9th Cir. 2010). Unocal differs from most of these other cases in that Burmese law is seriously deficient or
unknowable. See infra text accompanying note 185. Unocal is similar to some of these other cases in that the
foreign government’s interests may be illegitimate and out of step with the community of nations.
185 See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 959.
186 See 545 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 950–51
(9th Cir. 2009) (concerning the same allegations of misconduct by the Dow Chemical Company in Ivory
Coast).
181
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and manufacturing in the United States various toxic pesticides that were
banned in the United States and that caused sterility when used in banana and
pineapple plantations in Ivory Coast.187 The Abagninin scenario assumes a
defendant-based and conduct-based connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign
plaintiffs, domestic defendants, domestic misconduct, foreign injury, and both
foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the proceedings.188
5. Plaintiff and Defendant Nexus. The fifth scenario arises from the facts
alleged in Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc.189 American and Palestinian nationals
alleged human rights abuses, including war crimes and extrajudicial killings,
perpetrated by the Israeli Defense Forces and an American corporation
following the demolition of Palestinian homes in Gaza using custom-made
armored bulldozers manufactured in the United States.190 The Corrie scenario
assumes a plaintiff-based and defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum,
with at least one domestic plaintiff, a domestic defendant, foreign misconduct,
foreign injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the
proceedings.191
6. Conduct, Injury, and Defendant Nexus. The sixth scenario arises from
facts alleged in Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc.192 Foreign nationals
alleged human rights abuses, including torture and cruel and inhumane
treatment, perpetrated by an American corporation at an immigration
deportation detention facility in New Jersey.193 The Jama scenario assumes a
187

Abagninin, 545 F.3d at 735–36.
Id. Although less common than other fact patterns, there are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See,
e.g., Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2008); Bano v.
Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 2004).
189 See 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007).
190 Id.
191 See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce
N.A., 578 F.3d 1283, 1286–87, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009); Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006);
Jean v. Dorélien, 431 F.3d 776, 777–78, 783 (11th Cir. 2005); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790–
91 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 1996); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Aldana is unusual in that the plaintiffs and defendants had a common domicile in
Florida, although the plaintiffs acquired it after the torts occurred. See Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1293, 1303. In
Arce, Jean, Hilao, Abebe-Jira, and Filartiga, the plaintiffs and defendants acquired residency in the United
States after the torts were committed. See Arce, 434 F.3d at 1256; Jean, 431 F.3d at 779; Hilao, 103 F.3d at
791; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 846; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. In Jean, Hilao, and Abebe-Jira, that after-acquired
jurisdiction was common between the parties, namely Florida, Hawaii, and Georgia, respectively. See Jean,
431 F.3d at 783; Hilao, 103 F.3d at 791; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 846.
192 See 577 F.3d 169, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Jama v. U.S. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345–46
(D.N.J. 2004); Jama v. U.S. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 (D.N.J. 2004); Jama v. U.S. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 358 (D.N.J. 1998).
193 See Jama, 577 F.3d at 171.
188
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conduct-based, injury-based, and defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum,
with foreign plaintiffs, a domestic defendant, domestic misconduct, domestic
injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the
proceedings.194
These six factual scenarios highlight typical facts in current human rights
litigation. In each scenario, the nexus to the forum adjudicating the dispute is
different, allowing one to test how each choice-of-law approach might assess
the appropriate application of substantive tort law.195 The tentative summary
that follows suggests how complicated such a choice-of-law analysis might be.
The result is the application of either domestic or foreign tort law, depending
on the approach applied to the given facts.
These fact patterns are necessarily incomplete. They do not address some
of the fact patterns discussed in traditional domestic choice-of-law
commentary.196 This omission is deliberate, reflecting the absence of such fact
patterns in typical international human rights litigation. It is rare in human
rights litigation, for example, that the plaintiff and defendant will have a
common domicile but that the wrongful conduct and injury will occur outside
their common domicile. Nor do these fact patterns fit the typical scenarios
outlined in the terrorism context above. It is rare in human rights litigation for
the defendant to commit human rights violations with the political objective of
injuring the United States.
B. Human Rights and the Most Significant Relationship Approach
The most significant relationship test gives courts significant flexibility. To
the extent courts apply the lex loci delicti presumption seriously, most of the
six factual scenarios are easily resolved.197 As discussed below, lex loci delicti
results in the application of foreign tort law in at least four of the six factual

194 See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 314–
15 (2d Cir. 2012); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 128–30 (2d Cir. 2010); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d
767, 769–70 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 2003). In some respects Sosa is similar to this fact pattern, although the events occurred both abroad
and within the United States and the defendants were government officials, thereby raising federal question
jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).
195 In terms of nomenclature, I will use “foreign law” to refer to tort laws outside the United States and
“domestic law” to refer to tort laws within the United States.
196 See, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 138–39 (2008)
(outlining “Typical Fact–Law Patterns” in interstate disputes).
197 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146, 156, 175 (1971).
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scenarios, and perhaps a fifth depending on whether a court would refuse to
apply Burmese law based on a public policy exception.198
Of course, the territorial presumption is only the starting point. That
presumption may be overcome based on balancing the various Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws “contacts” and “factors.”199 As applied, the
contacts set forth in Restatement section 145 generally favor the application of
lex loci delicti in all six scenarios. With the exception of Jama, all the injuries
occurred abroad. With the exception of Abagninin and Jama, all the wrongful
conduct occurred abroad. In none of the six scenarios do the parties have
common domiciles, although the plaintiffs and defendants in Corrie and Licea
have domestic (albeit split) domiciles.200 The parties’ relationship in all six
scenarios was centered in the same place where the tort occurred. Thus, the
balance of contacts under Restatement section 145 does not alter the territorial
presumption.
Reliance on Restatement section 6 factors is more complicated. These
factors permit governmental interests and other principles to weigh in the
balance, with no particular guidance as to the balance among the factors. As
discussed in Part III, courts may rely on governmental interests to apply
domestic laws to resolve disputes involving foreign torts.201 Unlike the
terrorism context, the United States is not the target of abuse in any of the six
factual scenarios, and therefore the governmental interests will flow from each
jurisdiction’s relationship to the conduct, injury, and parties.
The other Restatement section 6 factors are more nebulous, focusing on the
needs of the international system; the policies of the particular field of law;
198

See infra text accompanying notes 200–14.
The nonexhaustive list of contacts includes the following: “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b)
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971). The seven factors are
the following:
199

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c)
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
200 The domestic connection is attenuated in Licea because the plaintiffs moved to Florida after the tort
occurred. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 107–44.
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certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and ease of determination of
the applicable law.202 Based on these factors, courts may overcome the lex loci
presumption by relying on Restatement section 6 factors rather than the
Restatement section 145 contacts.
Under the facts of Kiobel, there is no connection to any U.S. forum and no
forum interest in the dispute. None of the parties or events have a nexus to the
forum, making it difficult to discern a forum interest. Other jurisdictions—
particularly Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—all have
legitimate interests in the outcome of the dispute.203 The needs of the
international system favor outcomes that “further harmonious relations
between states and [that] facilitate commercial intercourse between them.”204
Holding a foreign corporation accountable under Nigerian law for conduct in
Nigeria that injures Nigerians advances those concerns. Tort law is designed to
deter accidents and pursue corrective justice,205 and those policies are
advanced by the choice of a sophisticated and robust torts regime.
Predictability and uniformity of results favor the application of Nigerian law,
in that the outcome of claims by Nigerians for torts committed in Nigeria
should not depend on the nationality of the tortfeasor. The ease of
determination and application of the law to be applied might favor domestic
law over foreign law, but as among Dutch, English, or Nigerian law, the
burden is not dissimilar. Thus, while not every factor favors Nigerian law, the
Restatement section 6 factors, on balance, support the lex loci presumption.
The analysis in Unocal adds a number of new factors to the analysis. The
defendant is an American corporation based in California, which generates

202

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).
Nigeria’s interests relate to regulating conduct within its territory, remedying harms occurring within
its territory, protecting its residents from wrongful conduct, and potentially immunizing corporations acting in
concert with government tortfeasors. The Dutch and English interests flow out of those jurisdictions’
relationships with the defendant corporation.
204 SYMEONIDES, supra note 196, at 104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt.
d) (internal quotation mark omitted).
205 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–31 (1970)
(identifying the reduction of the cost of accidents as the primary goal of tort law); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987) (emphasizing efficient resource
allocation as the primary goal of tort law); Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory,
63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2010) (highlighting the compensation of harm caused as the primary goal of tort
law); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 325 (1992) (discussing corrective justice and the duties
it imposes); Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1243 (1988) (book review)
(emphasizing deterrence as a function of tort law).
203
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governmental interests not present in Kiobel.206 Burma’s governmental
interests are complicated because historically the authoritarian regime has
displayed little concern for its people and the wrongful conduct relates to
alleged corporate collusion with government abuse.207 Burma’s interests may
favor corporate immunity over accountability, but a court is unlikely to credit
such interests. The content of Burmese law is unknowable,208 making its
application difficult, and any results uncertain and unpredictable. The absence
of any discernible Burmese tort law does nothing to advance the policies that
underlie modern tort law. Finally, given Burma’s status in the international
order (at least until recently), the choice of a particular law will not measurably
alter the difficult relationship that Burma has with the outside world. On
balance, the Restatement section 6 factors favor the application of domestic
law over Burmese law, with forum law or the defendant’s home jurisdiction
(California) the most plausible candidates.
As for Licea, the plaintiffs have an attenuated connection to Florida based
on their current residency,209 but no other Restatement section 6 factor is
sufficient to overcome the territorial presumption. Applying Curaçaoan law
advances the needs of the international system. The result in the case should
not depend on where the plaintiffs reside following the commission of the tort,
and the application of Florida law would openly invite forum shopping. On
balance these factors do not favor displacement of the lex loci delicti.
Corrie presents the additional factor of whether a forum’s nexus to the
plaintiff or defendant should heighten the governmental interest analysis.210
Both Corrie’s domicile (Washington) and Caterpillar’s domicile (Illinois) have
a legitimate interest in the outcome of the dispute, but those interests are
advanced by the application of Israeli law. Israeli law represents a
206

See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
207 For a general description of the history of Burma’s authoritarian regime, see MARTIN SMITH, BURMA:
INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY (1991).
208 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions), Nos. BC 237980, BC
237679, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003) (“[T]his court agrees . . . that the law of Burma is
‘radically indeterminate.’”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679, 2002 WL 33944505 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 10, 2002) (ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment); Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2002), available at http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/
sites/default/files/legal/Unocal-Tort-Liability-MSA-Ruling.pdf (ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment); Andrew Huxley, Note, Comparative Law Aspects of the Doe v. Unocal Choice of Law Hearing, 1
J. COMP. L. 219, 220–21 (2006).
209 See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
210 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007).
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sophisticated common law tort system with British roots that would achieve
the same results as the application of Washington or Illinois law.211 Unless a
court focuses on the common nationality of the parties,212 no other Restatement
section 6 factor would alter the territorial presumption favoring Israeli law.
The Restatement section 6 analysis in Abagninin is complicated by the fact
that the commission of the tort occurred in California and the resulting injuries
occurred in Ivory Coast.213 A Restatement (Second) jurisdiction would likely
recognize California’s legitimate interest in regulating a California
corporation’s wrongful conduct within its borders. Ivory Coast has a strong
interest in remedying injuries caused to its citizens within its borders, but those
interests may be advanced by the application of California’s robust products
liability law. The forum would also find California law easier to determine and
apply, and it would find that California’s products liability laws are well suited
to advance the objectives of modern tort laws. While other Restatement section
6 factors may favor Ivory Coast law, the balance of factors would likely result
in a court’s preference for California over Ivory Coast law.
With Jama, none of the Restatement section 6 factors favor displacement of
the territorial presumption. The smooth functioning of the international system
is enhanced by the application of New Jersey law to regulate New Jersey–
based conduct that caused New Jersey–based injuries. New Jersey has a strong
governmental interest in regulating wrongful conduct within its borders.
General tort policies are advanced by the application of a sophisticated torts
regime, which creates incentives for avoiding accidents but also immunizes
government contractors acting within the scope of their authority.214
Application of New Jersey law to all the parties promotes predictable, uniform
results. There is no difficulty in discerning the content of New Jersey law. All
the factors point toward the application of New Jersey law.
In sum, a jurisdiction applying the majority approach would result in the
application of foreign law in Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie, and the application of
domestic tort law in Unocal, Abagninin, and Jama.

211 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1030–31 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 2007).
212 See Miller v. White, 702 A.2d 392, 396 (Vt. 1997) (“In the international sphere, it is generally
considered appropriate to apply the laws of the domiciliary forum to tort claims that involve the residents of a
single country, regardless of where the tort took place.”).
213 See Abagninin v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008).
214 See Jama v. U.S. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 686–88 (D.N.J. 2004).
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C. Applying the Lex Loci Delicti Approach
With lex loci delicti, there must be an injury-based connection to the forum
for forum law to apply.215 The ten jurisdictions that apply lex loci delicti216
would have little difficulty applying the appropriate choice of law under five of
the six models outlined above. In Kiobel, Licea, Unocal, Abagninin, and
Corrie, the injuries occurred abroad and therefore foreign substantive tort law
should be applied to resolve the dispute. Consequently, Nigerian, Curaçaoan,
Burmese, Ivory Coast, and Israeli law, respectively, would apply to resolve the
disputes. Given the all-important question of the place of injury, it is irrelevant
that tortious conduct in Abagninin occurred in the United States. Conversely,
in Jama the resulting injuries occurred in New Jersey, and therefore the
applicable substantive tort law would be New Jersey law.
The only significant question in applying the lex loci delicti approach is
whether a public policy exception might preclude the application of foreign
law. Doing so would require a showing that the application of foreign law
would violate good morals or natural justice, or offend fundamental principles
of justice in the forum.217 Such a public policy invocation would be a rare
event among the civilized nations of the world.218 Under the facts alleged in
Unocal, for example, applying Burmese law to resolve claims against
corporate collusion with the Burmese government may foreclose any remedy
and offend the forum’s public policy.
However, the public policy exception typically is used negatively to refuse
enforcement of a foreign right, not offensively to create a cause of action that
does not exist at the place of the wrong.219 There are, of course, exceptions,220
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 cmt. c (1971) (“The rule of this Section
calls for application of the local law of the state where the injury occurred unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”).
216 The ten jurisdictions are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra text accompanying notes 69–75.
217 See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918); Rauton v. Pullman
Co., 191 S.E. 416, 422 (S.C. 1937).
218 See Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 969, 1015–16 (1956) (“If the foreign law normally applicable violates the strongest moral convictions or
appears profoundly unjust at the forum, the law should not be applied. . . . Yet such cases, between countries
of the civilized world and certainly between the states, will be few indeed.”); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 617 (Md. 1985).
219 See Loucks, 120 N.E. at 200–02 (“A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be
sued upon in another unless public policy forbids. That is the generally accepted rule in the United States. . . .
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual
notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental
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and a court that is willing to use the public policy exception offensively may
conclude that forum law should prevail. In the actual facts of Unocal, a state
court judge did precisely that, concluding that “to the extent Burma law
precludes Plaintiffs’ tort claims in this case, specifically the forced labor
claims, this court invokes the public policy exception to the traditional choice
of law rules.”221
If courts use the public policy exception both offensively and defensively,
then recourse to the lex loci delicti approach would result in the application of
foreign law in four of the scenarios—Kiobel, Licea, Abagninin, and Corrie—
and domestic law in two of the scenarios—Unocal and Jama.
D. Applying the Governmental Interest Approach
With the governmental interest approach there are two major variants: the
comparative impairment version that balances competing governmental
interests, and the lex fori version that gives presumptive weight to the forum’s
interest.222
1. Comparative Impairment. With the comparative impairment approach
applied in California and the District of Columbia, forum law will apply (1) if
the forum has an interest in the dispute and the laws of the other jurisdiction
are not different or (2) when the laws are different and the forum’s interests
would be more impaired than the interests of the other jurisdictions.223 As
noted above, the focus with comparative impairment is not which law
manifests the “better or the worthier social policy,” but rather “which state’s
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal.”); SYMEONIDES, supra note 196, at 84; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 327, 339–40 (1999); James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict
of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci Doctrine, the Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W.
VA. L. REV. 957, 984 (1990).
220 See, e.g., Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995); Willey v. Bracken, 719 S.E.2d 714, 721 (W.
Va. 2010).
221 See Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions, Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679, slip op. at 10 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 30, 2003). The judge also stated that“[f]oreign laws will not be given effect when contrary to
the public policy of California.” Id. (quoting Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken, 33 Cal. App. 3d 754, 763
(1973)). Furthermore, the judge noted that “[t]his public policy exception applies where the ‘foreign law is so
offensive to our public policy as to be prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the general
interests of the citizens.’” Id. (quoting Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 126, 135 (1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 82–89.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 86–89.
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the other state.”224 This test is particularly difficult to apply in the human rights
context, given that in some circumstances the foreign government’s interests
are an illegitimate attempt to avoid the consequences of its own misconduct.
In all six of the factual scenarios, the governmental interests at stake are not
as paramount as the interests at stake in the terrorism cases outlined in Part III
above. Neither the United States, nor any of the several states, are the target of
the human rights violations. By definition, terrorism is intended to influence
government conduct or policies.225 Other human rights violations, by contrast,
typically do not target governments. A court is unlikely to subordinate the
interests of the United States in the international terrorism context, whereas in
other human rights contexts the governmental interest of the United States or
the several States will be more limited.
Applying this approach to the facts in Kiobel, the forum has no
governmental interest in applying its law because there is no nexus whatsoever
to the forum. In the absence of such an interest, there is a false conflict226 and
therefore no need to analyze whether the laws of the affected jurisdictions are
different, or to undertake a comparative impairment analysis. Accordingly,
courts would apply British, Dutch, or Nigerian law.
With the other five scenarios, the forum has some interest in the dispute,
and therefore an initial inquiry is required as to whether the forum’s law differs
from the laws of other affected jurisdictions. If not, then forum law would
apply; if so, then a comparative impairment analysis would be required.
In Licea, because the plaintiffs were not domiciliaries at the time of the
tort,227 Florida’s interests are diminished, although one could argue that Cuban
mistreatment of its citizens creates harmful effects within Florida resulting
from Cuban mass migration. Cuba’s interests are to avoid liability, with Cuban
nationals alleging corporate collusion with the Cuban government to commit

224 McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 533 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Kearney v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012) (defining “international terrorism” in part as violent acts intended
“to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion . . . or . . . affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”).
226 See Kearney, 137 P.3d at 924 (suggesting a “false conflict” to be a situation where “there is . . . no
problem in choosing the applicable rule of law where only one of the states has an interest in having its law
applied” (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
227 See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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human rights abuses.228 A court is unlikely to credit such concerns. With the
forum having no other interest at stake, Curaçaoan law would apply based on
that jurisdiction’s paramount interest in curtailing human trafficking within its
borders.
With the facts of Unocal, California’s principal governmental interest is
regulating the behavior of a California corporation, which likely would be
sufficient to apply California law.229 A California court is unlikely to take
cognizance of Burma’s interest in protecting corporations that aid and abet
Burmese government abuse, or prioritize that interest over California’s
interests. In addition, the inability to determine the content of Burma’s tort law
would likely preclude the application of Burmese law.230
As for Corrie, the decedent was a Washington resident, the defendant is an
Illinois domiciliary, and all the relevant conduct and injuries occurred in
Israel.231 A comparative impairment jurisdiction would have the unenviable
task of determining whether Israel’s interests in regulating its affairs in Gaza
are a legitimate effort to shield government contractors from liability and if so,
whether those interests should be subordinated to Washington’s interest in
protecting its residents or Illinois’s interest in regulating its corporate
defendants. In the actual facts of Corrie, the federal court resolved the question
by concluding that under any applicable tort law Corrie’s claim would fail.232
A false conflict would avoid the need for a choice-of-law analysis. In the
absence of a false conflict, a court would likely conclude that Israel’s interest
in controlling its affairs in Gaza during the second intifada should not be
subordinated to the governmental interests of either Washington or Illinois.

228

See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
See Bowoto v. Chevron, Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2006) (noting “California has an interest in ensuring that its corporation behave in an appropriate manner. This
interest is magnified by the seriousness of the allegations brought against defendants” (citation omitted));
Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 672 (“[W]hen the defendant is a resident of California and the tortious conduct giving
rise to the wrongful death action occurs here, California’s deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly
advanced by application of its own law.”); Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court
Human Rights Actions, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 45, 50 (2013) (“The best hope for applying the forum state’s law
would be if one or more of the parties were a citizen of the forum state—perhaps a corporate defendant with its
headquarters in the forum state. In such a case, one could make a reasonable argument that applying the forum
state’s tort law would serve a deterrent interest and thus justify application of forum law.”).
230 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
231 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–23 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 2007).
232 See id. at 1030–31.
229
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With Abagninin, California has a strong interest in regulating the conduct
of its corporate citizens that occurs in whole or in part within its borders.233
Ivory Coast has a strong interest in regulating foreign investment and
protecting its citizens from toxic pesticides, but those interests are unlikely to
be impaired by the application of California law, which generally would favor
plaintiffs in disputes relating to product design and manufacturing defects.
Applying a comparative impairment approach would result in the application
of California law.
The strongest governmental interest would arise from facts similar to Jama,
with the government’s interest triggered by the defendant’s domicile, the
tortious conduct, and the resulting injury.234 The only other potential
jurisdictions that have an interest in the dispute are the plaintiffs’ domiciles,
but those interests would be advanced by the application of robust New Jersey
tort law. Under the facts of Jama, a comparative impairment analysis would
require the application of New Jersey tort law.
Thus applying the comparative impairment variant, in almost all of the
factual scenarios a law other than forum law would apply to resolve the
dispute. In some cases—Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie—this likely would result in
the application of foreign law. In other cases—Abagninin, Unocal, and Jama—
some version of domestic tort law would apply, based on a nexus to the
plaintiff, defendant, conduct, or injury.
2. Lex Fori. The lex fori variant requires either a defendant-based, plaintiffbased, conduct-based, or injury-based connection to the forum to create the
requisite governmental interest in applying forum law. With the lex fori
version applied in Kentucky and Michigan, forum law is presumptively applied
unless the forum’s connection to the dispute is simply too remote.235 Where the
tort occurred outside the jurisdiction and no party had a connection to the
forum, the presumption favoring forum law typically will be overcome. In the
absence of forum interest, a court would apply the law with the greatest
governmental interest in the dispute.
Applying this approach, there is no reason to apply lex fori in the Kiobel
scenario because the connection to the forum is simply too remote, none of the
constituent acts occurred in the forum, and none of the parties have any
233
234
235

See Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10; cf. Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 669–74.
See Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2009).
See supra text accompanying notes 82–85.
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connection to the forum. Therefore, the choice-of-law analysis would require
the application of another substantive law, presumably British, Dutch, or
Nigerian law.
The other scenarios require further explanation. Under the lex fori
approach, as long as there is some significant connection with the forum, then
its law should apply, even if other jurisdictions have a closer connection to the
dispute. Thus, assuming the American defendants in the Unocal, Abagninin,
Corrie, or Jama scenarios were incorporated, had their principal places of
business, or resided in the forum, the lex fori law should apply. Likewise, if the
plaintiffs in Corrie or Licea resided in the forum, that too would be
sufficient.236 Further, if some of the tortious conduct in Abagninin or Jama
occurred within the forum—the detention facility in Jama was located there, or
the pesticides in Abagninin were designed and manufactured there—that likely
would be sufficient to apply the lex fori law. Finally, if the resulting injury in
Jama occurred within the forum, that almost certainly would be sufficient to
apply forum law.
In the actual facts of these cases, none of the parties or events had any
connection to either Michigan or Kentucky that would trigger the forum’s
interests. Therefore these lex fori jurisdictions would apply the law of the
jurisdiction that had the greatest interest in the case. As with the comparative
impairment approach, the result would be the application of foreign law in
Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie and the application of domestic law in Abagninin,
Unocal, and Jama.
E. Applying the “Better Law” Approach
With the “better law” approach, courts may pursue individual justice in
particular cases by choosing the right set of rules.237 Courts are free to consider
the quality of the available laws and apply the law that achieves the desired
outcome.238 But the “better law” approach is complex and considers other
factors besides which law achieves individual justice. These factors include the
“A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate and international

236

To the extent plaintiffs established domicile in the forum after the tort occurred, as was the case in
Licea, that likely will be perceived as a more distant and insufficient connection to the forum. See supra text
accompanying notes 179–81.
237 The states that use this approach are Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. See supra text accompanying notes 92–100.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 92–94.
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order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; [and] D. Advancement of the
forum’s governmental interests.”239
Applying the “better law” approach to the factual scenarios, a court
engaging in a “better law” analysis in Kiobel would likely conclude that there
is no significant connection between the forum and the dispute, such that a
false conflict exists and forum law is not among the choices available.
Although forum law is clearly better in certain respects,240 the absence of a
nexus between the dispute and the forum would preclude recourse to forum
law.241 That would leave either Nigerian law or the law of the defendants’
domicile, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Under any “better law”
scenario, in a case such as Kiobel the forum will be forced to decide among
competing foreign laws.
As for the facts of Licea, Curaçaoan law is based on the Netherlands’ civil
law system, which recognizes intentional and negligent torts.242 Thus, a claim
of torture or arbitrary detention would be actionable as unlawful conduct
attributable to corporate or individual tortfeasors.243 Because both Curaçaoan
law and forum law provide effective relief for the claims alleged in Licea, it is
239

Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282.
Nigerian tort law requires that a plaintiff prove the charge of battery beyond a reasonable doubt, while
intentional torts in the United States require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Okuarume v.
Obabokor, [1965] NSCC 286, 287 (Nigeria), discussed in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1128–29
(9th Cir. 2010).
241 See Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Ark. 2002) (applying the “better law”
approach, where the forum did not have a sufficient relationship to the dispute, the Arkansas Supreme Court
declined to apply Arkansas law with a longer statute of limitations period to resolve a dispute between nondomiciliary plaintiff and non-domiciliary defendant involving death that occurred outside the forum).
242 See Brief for Professor Alex-Geert Castermans et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. at 8–10, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2312828 [hereinafter
Amicus Curiae] (citing C. ASSERS, A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, C. ASSERS HANDLEIDING TOT DE
BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT, DEEL 6–IV: VERBINTENISSENRECHT. DE
VERBINTENIS UIT DE WET §§ 38–166 (A.S. Hartkamp & C.H. Sieburgh eds., 13th ed. 2011); C.C. VAN DAM,
AANSPRAKELIJKHEIDSRECHT §§ 801–923 (2000)); see also THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 677 (Hans
Warendorf et al. trans., 2009) (translating bk. 6, tit. 3, art. 162 of the code to mean that “[a] person who
commits a tort against another which is attributable to him, must repair the damage suffered by the other in
consequence thereof”); THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA 295 (Peter Haanappel et
al. trans., 2002) (translating bk. 6, tit. 3, art. 162 of the code to provide for the same tort liability as the
Netherlands’ code).
243 See Amicus Curiae, supra note 242, at 10–11 (noting that civil courts in the Netherlands assert
jurisdiction over cases concerning international human rights violations) (citing Hof ’s-Gravenhage 5 juli
2011, 200.020.174/01 (Mothers of Srebrenica/ Netherlands) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 maart 2012,
400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 14 september 2011, NJF 2011, 427
(Silan/Netherlands) (Neth.) Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 februari 2010, 337050/HA ZA 09-1580, BM 1469
(Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell) (Neth.)).
240
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doubtful that a “better law” jurisdiction would conclude that either is better.
Other factors, such as predictability and maintenance of international order,
likely favor application of Curaçaoan law, while factors such as the
simplification of the judicial task and advancing the forum’s governmental
interests likely favor forum law. Given the other relevant connections to
Curaçao, a “better law” jurisdiction would likely apply Curaçaoan law.
The facts of Unocal raise the distinct possibility that the “better law”
approach would lead to the application of domestic law. As noted above,
Burmese tort law is difficult to identify, with few primary or secondary
materials outlining the basic contours of the law. One can scarcely have
confidence in the proper application of Burmese law if that law is
indecipherable. Moreover, there are few cases interpreting the law. The State
Department’s Burma 2012 Human Rights Report depicts a judicial system that
is “seriously flawed,” with “no reported examples of successful attempts” to
use either criminal or civil law to remedy human rights violations.244 This
comports with a California state court judge’s findings in Unocal that Burmese
law is inaccessible.245 As such, it is highly unlikely that a court applying the
“better law” approach would find chimerical foreign law superior to forum
law.
The “better law” approach as applied to the facts of Abagninin presents the
difficult question of whether international human rights law might directly
apply to resolve the dispute because Ivory Coast is a monist state.246 As such,
international treaties are automatically incorporated in the domestic order with
a status above national legislation.247 In the absence of applicable international
244

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, 2012 COUNTRY REPORTS
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BURMA 8–10 (2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
204400.pdf.
245 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
246 Monism is the view “that international and domestic law are part of the same legal order, international
law is automatically incorporated into each nation’s legal system, and international law is supreme over
domestic law.” Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999).
247 See CONSTITUTION DE LA CÔTE D’IVOIRE July 23, 2000, tit. 6, art. 87 (“Les Traités ou Accords
régulièrement ratifiés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour
chaque Traité ou Accord, de son application par l’autre partie.”), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS
ILLUSTRATED: CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 2000, at 15 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., 2010)
(“The Treaties or Agreements regularly ratified have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the
laws, provided, for each Treaty or Agreement, that it is applied by the other party.”); see also Armand Tanoh
& Horace Adjolohoun, International Law and Human Rights Litigation in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN AFRICA 109, 110–14 (Magnus Killander
ed., 2010).
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law, Ivory Coast follows the French Civil Code with respect to torts.248 Thus, a
court applying the better law would be forced to decide whether French-based
tort law, together with international human rights law incorporated into Ivory
Coast law, might serve the ends of justice better than California law. Given the
centrality of the products liability claims in Abagninin, combined with other
choice-influencing factors, a court is likely to determine that California law
should apply as the better law.
The choice of the better law in Corrie is fact intensive, based on disputed
questions relating to contributory negligence, proximate causation,
comparative fault, assumption of risk, and joint and several liability. A “better
law” analysis would weigh such legal elements to reach the proper conclusion
as to the just result.249 A court in a “better law” jurisdiction is unlikely to
determine that Israeli law is inferior or antiquated compared to the forum’s tort
law.250 As with Licea, the other factors likely will not consistently favor one
law over the other, but given the relevant connections to Israel, a “better law”
jurisdiction would likely apply Israeli law.
Finally, with Jama the central legal question would be whether the
government contractors deserve sovereign immunity in the context where the
defendants acted outside the scope of their authority in abusing the plaintiffs. A
court applying the better law would likely apply forum law in the absence of
any substantive conflict with New Jersey law. But in any case, domestic tort
law would prevail.

248 Compare CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.
do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&dateTexte=20060406 (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause
à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer,” which when translated
provides, “Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it
occurred, to compensate it.” (Georges Rouhette & Anne Rouhette-Berton trans., 2006), http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_22.pdf), with CODE CIVIL art. 1382 (Côte d’Ivoire),
available at http://www.loidici.com/Codecivilcentral/codecivilcontratquasidelits.php (providing the same); see
also Geneviève Viney, Tort Liability, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 237 (George A. Bermann & Etienne
Picard eds., 2008) (providing an overview of French tort law). The confluence of these two systems is unclear
but presumably would permit the application of international law for torts that violated human rights treaties
and the application of traditional tort claims for lesser malfeasances.
249 Israeli tort law, like its counterpart in the United States, is well developed and sophisticated. For
commentary on Israeli tort law, see, for example, Israel Gilead, Israel, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAWS: TORT LAW (Sophie Stijns ed., 2003); Israel Gilead & Tamar Gidron, Tort Law in Israel: An Overview,
in XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW § II.A.5 (2006).
250 As noted above, the federal court in Corrie avoided the question of choosing an applicable tort law by
concluding that plaintiff’s claim would fail under any applicable law. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 2d 1019, 1030–31 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).

ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

1142

6/9/2014 9:06 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1089

The “better law” approach likely would result in the application of foreign
law in Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie, and the application of domestic law in
Unocal, Abagninin, and Jama.
F. Applying the Eclectic Approach
An eclectic choice-of-law approach would combine various elements of the
previous approaches with unpredictable results for our factual scenarios.251
With all six of the factual scenarios, the parties have split domiciles,
leading to a presumption favoring lex loci delicti with respect to loss-allocating
rules.252 Thus, in Kiobel the presumption favors the application of Nigerian
law, while in Licea, Unocal, Abagninin, Corrie, and Jama, the presumption
favors the application of the laws of Curaçao, Burma, Ivory Coast, Israel, and
New Jersey, respectively. In none of these factual scenarios was the place of
the tortious behavior fortuitous, which might obviate the territorial
presumption.253
Under the Neumeier rules, the territorial presumption applicable in split
domiciles may be overcome to “advance the relevant substantive law
purposes.”254 This eclectic approach incorporates governmental interests into
the analysis, interests such as protecting New York residents injured in foreign
states or shielding New York defendants.255 But with no New York plaintiffs
or defendants, there are no obvious New York interests justifying a departure
from the territorial presumption. In addition, “the number and intensity of
contacts is relevant when considering whether to deviate” from the territorial
presumption,256 and in all six scenarios those contacts favor the maintenance of
the lex loci delicti presumption.
Abagninin raises the difficult question of the appropriate loss-allocating
rule when the parties have split domiciles and the wrongful conduct occurred
in the defendants’ home jurisdiction while the injury occurred in the plaintiffs’
home jurisdiction. Assuming the place of wrongful conduct and defendants’

251 As the most important of the eclectic jurisdictions, this analysis will focus on New York’s eclectic
approach as discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 102–06.
252 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972).
253 See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d Cir. 1996); supra text accompanying
notes 145–52.
254 Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458.
255 See id. at 456–58.
256 Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., 952 N.E.2d 1033, 1044 (N.Y. 2011).
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domicile (California) has a pro-defendant law, and the place of injury and
plaintiffs’ domicile (in this case, Ivory Coast) has a pro-plaintiff law, a court
would be faced with a factual scenario outside the traditional Neumeier
paradigm.257 In such a scenario, the application of Ivory Coast law would be
appropriate if the defendants foresaw the resulting injury in Ivory Coast.258 If,
on the other hand, California law seeks to regulate its corporations’ wrongful
conduct259 and Ivory Coast law seeks to protect its citizens from wrongful
conduct,260 the interests of both jurisdictions would align and California law
would apply.
To the extent the choice-of-law question concerns conduct-regulating rules,
New York courts are to give “controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”261 In
the conduct-regulating context, the governmental interest will focus on the
locus of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, not the locus of the plaintiff’s
injuries.262 In Licci and Wultz, this led to the application of New York and
Chinese law, respectively, to resolve claims arising from terrorist attacks in
Israel.263 Assuming a court would apply conduct-regulating rules in a similar
fashion, the focus should be on the locus of the defendants’ wrongful conduct.
In most of the six factual scenarios, this would not alter the result because the
place of the tort and injury coincide. But in Abagninin, California law would
apply to the design and manufacture of the toxic chemicals.
Finally, any analysis of New York’s eclectic approach is not complete
without a public policy analysis, precluding the application of foreign law that
is contrary to New York public policy.264 Provided there are sufficient contacts
with New York,265 such a public policy exception would likely apply in factual
257
258
259

See HAY ET AL., supra note 48, § 17.44.
See id.
See Bowoto v. Chevron, Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,

2006).
260 See CODE CIVIL art. 1382 (Côte d’Ivoire) (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un
dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.”).
261 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fin.
One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
262 See id.; Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 865 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
263 See supra text accompanying notes 153–58.
264 See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687–89 (N.Y. 1985).
265 See Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 923 F.2d 957, 964 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that
“a party seeking to invoke a public policy exception to the application of foreign law must establish that there
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scenarios such as Doe v. Unocal, leading to the application of New York law
where Burmese law is unknowable or violates fundamental principles of
justice.266
The result under New York’s eclectic approach is the application of foreign
law in most of the factual scenarios except in Unocal, where New York public
policy would favor New York over Burmese law, and in Abagninin, where
conduct-regulating rules would favor the application of California law as the
place of wrongful conduct.
G. Summary of the Competing Approaches
The application of these choice-of-law approaches to the six factual
scenarios underscores the critical distinction that key facts play in the decision
as to the appropriate choice of law. This analysis is preliminary and subject to
correction based on more detailed analysis of the particular law and facts. But
this exercise illuminates the general contours of how choice of law would be
undertaken in the human rights context. Table 2 summarizes the results of our
analysis.

are enough important contacts between the parties, the occurrence and the New York forum to implicate [New
York’s] public policy and thus preclude enforcement of the foreign law.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the absence of sufficient contacts, New
York law would not apply.
266 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918). For a California court’s
application of public policy in this Unocal context, see Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions, Nos.
BC 237980, BC 237679, slip op. at 10 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003); and supra note 221 and accompanying
text.
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Table 2

No Nexus
(Kiobel)
After-Acquired
Plaintiff Nexus
(Licea)
Defendant
Nexus/Deficient
Foreign Law
(Unocal)
Defendant and
Conduct Nexus
(Abagninin)
Defendant and
Plaintiff Nexus
(Corrie)
Defendant,
Conduct, and
Injury Nexus
(Jama)

Most
Significant
Relationship
Foreign
Law

Lex Loci
Delicti

Comparative
Impairment

Lex Fori

Better
Law

Eclecticism

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Foreign
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Foreign
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

Domestic
Law

As Table 2 indicates, where there is no nexus to the United States, as in the
case of Kiobel, all six approaches are likely to apply foreign law. Where there
is only a plaintiff-based connection to the United States based on afteracquired domicile, as in the case of Licea, all six approaches are likely to apply
foreign law. Where there is a plaintiff-based and defendant-based connection
to the United States but the parties have split domiciles, as in the case of
Corrie, all six approaches are likely to apply foreign law. Where there is a
defendant-based and conduct-based connection to the United States, as in
Abagninin, five of the six approaches are likely to apply domestic law, and one
approach (lex loci delicti) is likely to apply foreign law. Where there is a
defendant-based connection to the United States and the alternative foreign law
is seriously deficient, as in the case of Unocal, all six approaches are likely to
apply domestic law. Finally, where there is a defendant-based, conduct-based,
and injury-based connection to the United States, as in the case of Jama, all six
approaches are likely to apply domestic law.
Our prediction of how the different choice-of-law approaches might resolve
human rights cases comports with empirical studies showing that courts do not
favor domestic law when confronted with international choice-of-law
scenarios. The results of one well-known study articulated the following
predictive rule:
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[A] judge is most likely to apply domestic law when the locus of the
underlying activity is mostly or all inside U.S. territory and the
parties are mostly or all domestic, and she is least likely to do so
when the locus of activity is mostly or all outside U.S. territory and
the parties are mostly or all foreign. This . . . prediction decreases . . .
267
as territoriality and personality become more balanced.

This prediction mirrors the results of our own analysis, with territoriality and
personality strongly affecting the outcome under all of the choice-of-law
approaches. The one significant caveat is that our analysis predicts that public
policy considerations in Unocal would lead to the application of domestic law
when other considerations would predict the choice of foreign law.
Diagnosing how choice-of-law principles might apply to human rights
claims does not answer the question of whether this approach is attractive. The
next Part outlines the virtues of transnational tort litigation as compared to
litigation under the ATS. From the perspective of human rights victims,
transnational tort litigation has numerous virtues over international human
rights litigation.
V. THE VIRTUES OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION
Transnational tort litigation has numerous distinctions from international
human rights litigation under the ATS. First, such litigation permits the
extraterritorial application of common law tort claims in appropriate
circumstances. Second, reliance on foreign laws typically will be available
given the universality of a cause of action for intentional torts. Third, tort
litigation provides lower thresholds for liability based on a wide range of
behavior, including intentional and negligent conduct. Fourth, tort laws hold
both individual and corporate actors liable for tortious conduct. Fifth, choiceof-law rules are sufficiently nuanced to apply one law to determine liability
and another law to determine damages. Sixth, transnational tort litigation
permits actions in state court, thereby avoiding the heightened pleading
standards applicable in federal courts. Seventh, for suits filed in state court
under state law, forum non conveniens dismissals do not have the same force
or favor as in federal courts. Finally, preemption will rarely be an issue where
a court applies state or foreign tort laws to resolve the dispute.

267 Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
719, 777 (2009).
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This is not to suggest that transnational tort litigation does not face
obstacles similar to human rights litigation under the ATS. For example, limits
on personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, head of state immunity, the act
of state doctrine, and the political question doctrine should apply with equal
force to tort and human rights claims.268 These limits ensure that state and
federal courts do not violate defendants’ minimum due process rights, do not
sit in judgment on the sovereign acts of other nations, and do not encroach on
matters reserved for the political branches.
A. Extraterritorial Application
State tort laws routinely are applied extraterritorially. There are
constitutional limits, but those limits are rarely meaningful.269 Under the Due
Process Clause, a state may apply its own laws if it has any “significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,” with the parties
and the occurrence or transaction.270 State choice-of-law principles incorporate
these constitutional limitations and refrain from applying state tort laws in the
absence of sufficient contacts or interests.271
Beyond these constitutional limits, there is no presumption against the
extraterritorial application of state tort laws. “[I]n contrast to federal courts
considering the reach of U.S. law abroad, courts generally do not regard the
decision to apply state law to events abroad in terms of the extraterritorial
268

See Whytock, Childress & Ramsey, supra note 39, at 6–7.
See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1075–82 (2009); Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992).
270 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A different, more stringent standard under the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the
extraterritorial application of state legislation. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 582–84 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). See generally Florey,
supra note 269, at 1084–94 (“In a series of cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court articulated a strong . . .
prohibition on extraterritoriality under the rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
271 The Court has declared that another constitutional limitation, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, must be
“interpreted against the background of principles developed in international conflicts law,” Wortman, 486 U.S.
at 723, perhaps suggesting that the state laws that are consistent with international principles would satisfy
constitutional limitations. See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial
Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 120–21 (1993). While both the Due Process Clause
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause limit the application of state law, only the Due Process Clause limits a
state’s application abroad. See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1531, 1552 n.161 (2011).
269
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reach of the state’s power to assert legislative jurisdiction.”272 Instead,
questions as to the appropriateness of applying state tort law to foreign conduct
are embedded in the choice-of-law analysis, resulting in the balancing of
interests, accommodations to the international system, and presumptions that
lex loci delicti will apply.273 In other words, the extraterritorial application of
state tort law is “independently regulated by each state’s choice-of-law
rules.”274 In this sense, choice of law adopts a reasonableness test for
prescriptive jurisdiction akin to the multifactor balancing approach
recommended by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.275
Importantly, to the extent constitutional or other limits circumscribe the
extraterritorial application of state tort laws, these limitations will not divest a
state court of general jurisdiction (or a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction) from adjudicating the claim; they will simply require the parties to
plead, and the court to apply, foreign tort law. Under the transitory tort
doctrine, courts of general jurisdiction are empowered to enforce tort
obligations arising under foreign law, and those obligations follow the person
and may be enforced wherever the person is found.276 “[S]ince a personal tort
claim is transitory in nature, it is . . . the general rule that . . . it may be sued
upon wherever the defendant is subject to suit . . . .”277 Thus, once personal
jurisdiction is established, the transitory tort doctrine presumes a court of
general jurisdiction is authorized to resolve claims based on causes of action
that arise in other jurisdictions.278 Even if state tort laws may not regulate the
foreign conduct of foreign defendants, state courts may adjudicate claims
alleging violations of foreign law.

272 Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial Effects
of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 552 (2012).
273 See supra text accompanying notes 57–68.
274 Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply Abroad, 102 GEO. L.J.
301, 306 (2014).
275 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402–03 (1987). This also approximates
the approach of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Kiobel. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659, 1673–77 (2013) (Breyer, J. concurring).
276 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912)); Slater v.
Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
277 Richardson v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 118 P.2d 985, 991 (Wash. 1941); accord Mendoza v.
Neudorfer Eng’rs, Inc., 185 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
278 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665–66.
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B. Universal Norms
Transnational tort claims are universal. One need not invoke international
law or domestic tort laws to find a violation of human rights. Almost all the
international norms that are the subject of human rights litigation find their
corollary in municipal law. A retreat from international law litigation is not an
invitation to impunity.
In public law, constitutions increasingly are generic in their guarantees. The
prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention is reflected in 94% of all
constitutions, the prohibition on torture in 84% of all constitutions, and the
right to life in 78% of all constitutions.279 Over twenty-five rights are common
to over 70% of all constitutions, and they may therefore be described as a
collection of generic bills of rights.280 Guarantees of life and liberty are a
common norm in global constitutionalism.
As far as private law, a comparative analysis of tort laws likewise finds a
move toward harmonization, particularly with respect to intentional torts.
Liability for intentional torts is common in virtually every tort system in the
world.281 According to the International Commission of Jurists, “[i]n every
jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor may be
held liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional
conduct it causes harm to someone else.”282 Regardless of the distinctions
between civil and common law, “in all jurisdictions the law of civil remedies
can be invoked to remedy harm to life, liberty, dignity, physical and mental
integrity and property.”283 Moreover, a comparison of choice-of-law rules
suggests that lex loci delicti is the approach applied in most countries.284
The harmonization of norms across legal systems has important
ramifications for transnational tort litigation. If one assumes a fair and
impartial adjudicator, remedies for harm to life and liberty are the law

279 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 762, 773–74 (2012).
280 Id. at 776–79.
281 See J. Limpens, R.M. Kruithof & A. Meinertzhagen-Limpens, Liability for One’s Own Act, in 11
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: TORTS ch. 2, at 3–12 (André Tunc ed., 1983).
282 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008),
available at http://www.icjcanada.org/fr/document/doc_2008-10_vol3.pdf.
283 Id. at 11.
284 See id. at 52.
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throughout the civilized world.285 Therefore, a decision to apply foreign law to
remedy wrongful conduct should provide, under most legal systems, a legal
basis for liability. There will be exceptions and important distinctions, but the
starting point of liability for intentional harm is common across almost all legal
systems.
The similarity among the tort laws of different countries increases the
likelihood that domestic tort law will be applied under the doctrine of false
conflicts. In essence, this doctrine holds that if the competing laws are the
same, there is no need to choose among them.286 For example, under the New
York choice-of-law principles that would have applied in Kiobel, “[t]he first
step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine
whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions
involved.”287 Laws are in conflict where “the applicable law from each
jurisdiction provides different substantive rules.”288 Where the laws of
competing jurisdictions are not in conflict and “New York law is among the
relevant choices, New York courts are free to apply it.”289
C. Lower Liability Thresholds
The threshold for establishing an actionable international law violation
under the ATS is incredibly high. According to the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Sosa, for a claim to be actionable under the ATS, “courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” that Blackstone
defined, viz., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
285 Indeed, when the problem is the quality of the adjudicator, not the foreign law, a state court may refuse
to transfer the case to a foreign jurisdiction under forum non conveniens and resolve the dispute by applying
foreign law. See infra text accompanying notes 322–38.
286 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94
(D.D.C. 2008); Gulf Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271 (S.D. Fla.
2007). A variation of this false-conflict analysis that is applied in the governmental interest approach to
conflict of laws looks to whether all competing states have an interest in applying their own laws. If only one
involved state has an interest in applying its law, there is a false conflict. See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution
and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958).
For an analysis of the false-conflict doctrine, see supra note 91.
287 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 937 (N.Y. 1993).
288 Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Elson v.
Defren, 726 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (App. Div. 2001).
289 Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
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ambassadors, and piracy.”290 In Sosa, the act of kidnapping and false
imprisonment did not give rise to an actionable claim under international
law.291 As the Court put it, “a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law.”292
This high threshold has led lower courts to routinely dismiss ATS claims
for torts relating to the environment, sexual misconduct, child labor, business
fraud, defamation, and the like.293 Instead, the ATS standard typically requires
conduct such as extrajudicial killings, torture, genocide, prolonged arbitrary
detention, nonconsensual human experimentation, crimes against humanity, or
systematic racial discrimination.294 “The common theme among these offenses
is that they contravened the law of nations, admitted of a judicial remedy, and
simultaneously threatened serious consequences in international affairs.”295
Transnational torts have much lower thresholds than the standards applied
under international law, allowing claims to be brought for intentional torts,
simple negligence, strict products liability, or any other harmful or offensive
conduct that constitutes a legal wrong. Human rights litigation is about grave
public wrongs; transnational tort litigation is about redressing simple, private
wrongs. “Tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil recourse against
those who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them. Tort
law is thus plainly private law in the sense that it is about empowering private
parties to initiate proceedings designed to hold tortfeasors accountable.”296 As
290

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
See id. at 698.
292 Id. at 738.
293 See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021–24 (7th Cir. 2011); Mora v. New
York, 524 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2008); Cisneros v. Aragon, 485 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2007); Flores v.
S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 236–37, 254 (2d Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161, 168 (5th Cir. 1999); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995); Maugein v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One
Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation
in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2264–65 (2004).
294 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer,
Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F.
Supp. 2d 1222, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074–79 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1093–94, (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Roe I v. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d
988, 1014 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Steinhardt, supra note 293, at 2264–65.
295 Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 173.
296 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 946–47 (2010).
291
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such, transnational tort litigation encompasses a wide range of legally wrongful
conduct, including conduct that is not morally blameworthy. By lowering the
threshold for actionable claims, a transnational tort system provides an
effective mechanism for private citizens to regulate dangerous and harmful
activities that fall below the human rights threshold.
Convincing a jury that a multinational corporation was negligent in its
overseas activities is far easier than convincing a jury that a corporation
intentionally aided and abetted torture or extrajudicial killings.297 If plaintiffs
embrace this lower threshold and pursue transnational torts, they increase the
chances that tortfeasors will become accident avoiders.
This is true regardless of whether domestic or foreign tort law is applied. In
tort systems around the world the standard of care owed to the public under
traditional tort law encompasses a broader range of conduct than the standard
owed under international human rights law.298 In some cases foreign tort laws
are broader than domestic tort laws, providing remedies for affronts to
dignity.299 Therefore, by reframing human rights violations as traditional torts,
the universe of protected interests expands significantly.
D. Corporate Liability
One of the most difficult aspects of international human rights litigation has
been the obligation to establish that corporate defendants aided and abetted
government abuse. There is an extensive debate regarding the standard for
accessorial liability under international law, with some circuit courts arguing
the standard should be purposeful intent, and others arguing that the standard
should be mere knowledge that an international-law violation would occur.300
297 Compare Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1122–26 (discussing a jury trial in favor of the corporation on all claims
of aiding and abetting torture and extrajudicial killings), with Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013,
99 (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (finding the corporation guilty of negligence in failing to maintain
pipelines that third parties sabotaged), and Roger Alford, Dutch Court Issues Mixed Ruling on Shell’s Liability
for Nigerian Environmental Claim, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 5, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2013/02/05/dutch-court-issues-mixed-ruling-on-shells-liability-for-nigerian-environmental-claim/.
298 See generally INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR TORT LAW (Ingrid Boone ed., 2001).
299 Borchers, supra note 229, at 51; Julie A. Davies & Dominic N. Dagbanja, The Role and Future of
Customary Tort Law in Ghana: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 26 ARIZ J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 310–11
(2009).
300 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765–66 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(2013) (noting that at least purposeful aiding and abetting is sufficient); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654
F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing the knowledge test);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring a
purposeful aiding and abetting test); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 272–77 (2d Cir.
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Transnational litigation applying domestic or foreign tort laws avoids this
problem. With civil liability applying foreign or domestic tort laws, evidence
that the corporate actor intended to commit an international-law violation is
simply irrelevant. Establishing that a corporate defendant aided and abetted
government abuse with the requisite intent is likewise irrelevant. What matters
is whether the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct would
cause harm.301
Corporate liability is an accepted principle of tort law throughout the
world.302 “Corporations have been subject to suit for centuries, and the concept
of corporate liability is a well-settled part of our ‘legal culture.’”303 The
question is not whether juridical entities may be liable for wrongful conduct
under domestic or foreign tort laws, but under what circumstances.304
E. Damages
As discussed above,305 an analysis of choice of law in the typical human
rights scenario will result in the application of foreign tort law. One of the
consequences of applying foreign law to resolve transnational torts is that the
available remedies often will be lower than those available under domestic
law. One prominent choice-of-law scholar has argued that the great risk of
human rights litigation in state courts is that those courts would feel “bound to
apply the damage law of the foreign country” and “[i]n practical terms, this
risks making actions unsustainable.”306
It is not apparent that this will be the result for transnational torts. Courts
routinely separate the choice-of-law analysis for liability and damages,
2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (requiring a purposeful aiding
and abetting test); Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52 (2003). See
generally Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008)
(discussing the two standards).
301 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 282, at 12–13.
302 See Exxon, 654 F.3d at 48 (“[F]rom the earliest times to the present day, corporations have been liable
for torts.” (quoting JOSEPH K. ANGEL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 222–23 & n.1 (1832)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS,
supra note 282, at 10.
303 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner_amcu_unitedstates.authcheckdam.pdf.
304 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 282, at 28–41, 45–49.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 176–267.
306 Borchers, supra note 229, at 52.
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resulting in the application of one law to determine liability and another law to
determine damages.307 Quantification of damages typically is considered a
procedural question, resulting in the application of forum law.308 Moreover,
numerous cases have found that limitations on liability are false conflicts when
the defendant is a nonresident corporation. For jurisdictions that apply a
governmental interest analysis, for example, defendants invoking damage
limitations pursuant to foreign law must show that doing so will further the
interests of the foreign state.309 But “foreign states are generally presumed to
have absolutely no interest in reducing recovery by their residents against nonresident tortfeasors.”310 Accordingly, where a foreign jurisdiction has no
interest in protecting the financial exposure of the defendant, damage
limitations under foreign law will be ignored in favor of more liberal damage
standards applied under domestic law.
To the extent courts would apply the lower damage amounts applicable in
foreign countries, this is not necessarily a problem. In many respects this
limitation actually is a virtue of the transnational torts regime. Choice-of-law
analysis safeguards the uniform application of law by minimizing the impact
that forum shopping will have on the outcome of a case. If differential
damages applied depending upon the forum, then corporations subject to suit
in the United States would face discriminatory liability standards that other
competitors not amenable to suit would avoid.311 The result would be a
potential “tort tax” for doing business in the United States.
By this reasoning, pursuing transnational torts in the United States pursuant
to foreign liability standards strikes an appropriate balance. It provides an
effective forum for relief, but places defendants amenable to suit in the United
States on a comparatively equal footing with defendants amenable to suit in
307

See Eric Lasker & Rebecca Womeldorf, Prescription Drug Products Liability Litigation and Punitive
Damages Preemption, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 123, 126–27 (2013); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 959 (2004); Christopher G.
Stevenson, Note, Depecage: Embracing Complexity to Solve Choice-of-Law Issues, 37 IND. L. REV. 303, 311–
12 (2003).
308 See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States
Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 168–75 (1999).
309 See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974)).
310 Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1992); accord Downing v. Abercrombie &
Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001).
311 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 68, at 1146–47; Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for
Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161,
2194 (2012).
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other jurisdictions. Corporate defendants amenable to suit in the United States
should face liability risks for transnational torts similar to the risks faced by
corporations sued in other jurisdictions.312 The objective of a transnational torts
regime should encourage tortfeasors to avoid committing foreign torts, without
subjecting particular tortfeasors to discriminatory liability standards.
F. Notice Pleading
Filing state or foreign law claims in state court has distinct procedural
advantages. With Ashcroft v. Iqbal313 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,314
the Supreme Court has announced that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”315 This new pleading
standard “demands that the nonconclusory factual allegations reach a level of
plausibility that justifies the likely discovery expense.”316 Yet plaintiffs face
significant hurdles in pleading plausible human rights claims precisely because
they do not have access to discovery to determine questions such as whether a
corporate officer had the requisite purposeful intent to aid and abet human
rights abuses.317 Not surprisingly, this heightened pleading standard has
312 Corporate defendants have lost significant human rights cases applying foreign tort laws in
jurisdictions such as Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Dagi v Broken Hill
Proprietary Ltd. (No.2.) (1997) 1 VR 428 (Austl.); Hof ’s-Gravenhage 5 juli 2011, 200.020.174/01 (Mothers
of Srebrenica/ Netherlands) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013, 99 (Akpan/Royal Dutch
Shell PLC) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 maart 2012, 400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.);
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 14 september 2011, NJF 2011, 427 (Silan/Netherlands) (Neth.); Chandler v. Cape PLC,
[2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [1], [82] (appeal taken from Q.B.); Motto v. Trafigura Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ)
1150, [145] (appeal taken from Q.B.); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals Plc, [2010] EWHC (QB) 3228, [57],
[59] (U.K.); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals Plc, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475, [31] (U.K.); Amicus Curiae, supra
note 242, at 7–15; Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A
Comparative Scorecard, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 127, 130 (2013); Michael D. Goldhaber, U.K. Shell Deal
Spotlights Value of Common Law Model for Human Rights Litigation, CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202512820360.
313 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
314 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).
315 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
316 Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 62 (2010). There is some
empirical evidence suggesting that the heightened pleading standard in Iqbal and Twombly has not led to a
greater incidence of dismissals of tort claims. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 14 tbl.4 (2011) (reflecting a dismissal rate of 30.0% before Iqbal and 28.2% after
Iqbal), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
317 See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 730, 738 (2012). For an example of insufficient pleading of corporate mens rea,
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resulted in federal courts dismissing many international human rights
claims.318
Pleading a violation of transnational torts in most state courts faces no such
hurdles. The notice pleading standard applied in the majority of state courts is
“that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”319 Pursuing state law tort claims
in state courts is more likely to overcome a motion to dismiss than if the same
claim were filed in federal court. Thus, plaintiffs struggling with the
heightened federal pleading standard may wish to pursue state tort law claims
in state court, and file in the defendant’s home state to avoid removal to federal
court on diversity grounds.320 This is particularly so given that filing in the
defendant’s home state also minimizes the likelihood that the case will be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.321

see Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266–69 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
318 See, e.g., Abelesz, v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2012); Bigio v. CocaCola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 173–75 (2d Cir. 2012); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011);
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153–56 (11th Cir. 2011); Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266–69; Doe I v.
Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1098, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.,
738 F.3d 1048 (2013).
319 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46
(1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (identifying twenty-six states and the District of Columbia that
follow the Conley standard repudiated in Twombly); see also Mark W. Payne, The Post-Iqbal State of
Pleading: An Argument Opposing a Uniform National Pleading Regime, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 245, 259–
65 (2012) (summarizing pleading practices in state courts following Iqbal and Twombly); Z.W. Julius Chen,
Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1431, 1432 (2008) (summarizing history of pleading standards in state courts); Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Note,
Challenging the Plausibility Standard Under the Rules Enabling Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2379, 2385–86 (2013)
(“[A] majority of state appellate courts have either rejected the plausibility standard or declined to apply it.”
(footnote omitted)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal 14–18 (2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349 (summarizing
pleading practices in state courts following Iqbal and Twombly).
320 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”); Childress, supra
note 317, at 741.
321 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“With respect to a corporation, the place of
incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] bases for general jurisdiction.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735
(1988))); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (noting that general
jurisdiction requires affiliations “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the foreign corporation]
essentially at home in the forum State”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–90 (2011)
(discussing constitutional limits on specific jurisdiction).
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G. Forum Non Conveniens
Transnational litigation claims are often dismissed in federal court on the
basis of the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.322 Claims
brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for conduct on foreign
soil are ripe for dismissal because the forum is inconvenient.323 For suits filed
in state court under state law, however, dismissal on the basis of forum non
conveniens does not have the same force or favor as in federal court.324
Almost every state has established state standards for forum non
conveniens.325 The majority of states follow the federal standard set forth in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert326 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,327 but others
freely define their own standard.328 States that choose to depart from the
federal standard often make forum non conveniens dismissals impossible or
substantially more difficult. For example, Colorado, Louisiana, and Virginia
prohibit dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds if the plaintiff is a state
resident.329 Montana prohibits a forum non conveniens transfer outside the
state.330 Delaware requires a defendant to show overwhelming hardship in
order to succeed on a motion.331 Connecticut courts strongly disfavor such
dismissals, finding that the plaintiffs’ choice of forum “should rarely be
322 See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient Forum in
Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 169–70 (2012); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational
Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1095–97 (2010).
323 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 517–
28 (2011).
324 See Childress, supra note 322, at 171–72.
325 See Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1180 n.9 (R.I. 2008) (citing source of forum non
conveniens standard in forty-six states).
326 See 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
327 See 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
328 See Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV.
309, 315 & n.17 (2002) (identifying states that follow the federal standard); Linda J. Silberman, Developments
in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal
for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 518–25 (1993) (discussing state forum non conveniens
standards); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury
Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 950 & n.74 (1990) (identifying
the states that follow the federal standard); Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign
Policy: Time for Congressional Intervention?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 743, 748–58 (2012) (discussing the divergent
approaches of states).
329 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-1004 (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 123 (2012); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (West Supp. 2013).
330 Cook v. Soo Line R.R., 2008 MT 421, ¶ 16, 347 Mont. 372, 198 P.3d 310.
331 Ison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832, 837–38 (Del. 1999); Chrysler First Bus. Credit
Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. P’ship, 669 A.2d 104, 105 (Del. 1995); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198
A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964); see also Smith, supra note 328, at 756–57.
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disturbed” and that dismissal on forum non conveniens is a “drastic remedy
which the trial court must approach with caution and restraint.”332
As for states that follow the federal standard, they are not uniform in the
manner in which they apply it, providing plaintiffs with opportunities to use
those subtle differences to their advantage.333 For example, the Washington
Supreme Court has adopted the federal standard, but rejected Piper’s “lesser
deference” rule with respect to foreign plaintiffs.334 The Georgia Supreme
Court has adopted the federal standard for nonresident aliens, but not for
foreigners who reside within the United States.335 The Alaska Supreme Court
has held that where the “plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the forum state, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited
application.”336 New York forecloses forum non conveniens dismissals where
the parties to a contract agreed to be bound by New York law.337 Thus, despite
otherwise following Piper, many state standards are less solicitous to foreign
plaintiffs than the federal standard.
Given the frequency with which federal courts dismiss transnational tort
claims, state courts may be a preferred option for transnational claims. One
factor in the calculus of where to sue will be the state court vagaries in
applying forum non conveniens. But one should not make too much of these
differences. The balance of public and private interest factors common under
both federal and state standards promotes the policy of dismissing claims that
have an insufficient nexus to the forum. A court’s discretion in balancing the
various factors often makes it almost impossible to predict the outcome of a
forum non conveniens motion to dismiss.338
H. Preemption
Reliance on state tort laws such as wrongful death or assault and battery to
resolve disputes arising from foreign conduct may implicate foreign-affairs
concerns, particularly when the defendant acted in concert with foreign or U.S.

332 Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518, 524–25 (Conn. 1990) (italics removed) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
333 See Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non Conveniens Preclusion, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2194
(2008).
334 See Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1990).
335 See AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 377–78 (Ga. 2001).
336 Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 908 (Alaska 1985).
337 N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 327(b) (McKinney 2010).
338 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).
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government officials. But state tort laws represent a quintessential exercise of
traditional state prerogatives, and courts will be reluctant to invoke preemption
doctrines to dismiss traditional tort claims.339
As transnational tort litigation begins to address international human rights
abuses with greater frequency, there is a growing risk that state tort laws will
be applied extraterritorially and will conflict with federal laws or foreign
affairs concerns. In a few instances courts have held that state tort claims in the
transnational tort context must be dismissed under federal preemption.340
State laws designed to engage in foreign policy or interfere with foreign
affairs are particularly vulnerable to foreign affairs preemption.341 Conversely,
state laws of general applicability that are not designed to influence U.S.
foreign relations are unlikely to be dismissed under foreign affairs
preemption.342 Occasionally, as with allegations of tortious conduct by U.S.
government contractors during wartime, traditional state tort claims may be
dismissed under foreign affairs preemption.343 Preemption also is more likely
with traditional tort claims where state interests in the dispute are weak and the
claim implicates strong federal policies with respect to foreign affairs.344 Thus,
state tort claims may in rare circumstances face preemption issues, but
typically traditional tort laws of general applicability will avoid this fate.
Choice of law adds an additional wrinkle to the preemption analysis. In
many cases involving foreign conduct, the proper application of choice-of-law
principles will obviate preemption concerns. For example, in Doe VIII v.
339 See Wos v. E.M.A. ex. rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (2013) (“In our federal system, there is no
question that States possess the ‘traditional authority to provide tort remedies to their citizens’ as they see fit.”
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984))). For a discussion of preemption in the
context of states’ traditional competencies, see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003);
and Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000).
340 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1171, 1183–88 (C.D. Cal. 2005). State laws may be preempted under dormant preemption
doctrines, such as foreign affairs preemption or statutory preemption doctrines. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory
Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 203–08; Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2097–12 (2000).
341 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012); Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2010); Deutsch v. Turner Corp.,
324 F.3d 692, 708–11 (9th Cir. 2003).
342 See Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1075; Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964–65.
343 Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (“During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into combatant
activities over which the military retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s
engagement in such activities shall be preempted.”); cf. Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623
F.3d 1, 11–14 (1st Cir. 2010).
344 Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–88.
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Exxon Mobil Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that “[b]ecause Indonesian law
applies under District of Columbia choice of law rules, the court need not
address Exxon’s federal preemption argument regarding District of Columbia
and Delaware law.”345 When foreign law is applied, there is no application of
state law to be preempted. Foreign affairs preemption does not preempt a state
court’s exercise of its choice-of-law rules to apply foreign tort laws.346
CONCLUSION
The demise of the ATS following Kiobel will signal the rise of
transnational tort litigation. The presumption against extraterritoriality severely
limits the territorial reach of the ATS, requiring plaintiffs to establish that
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force
to displace the presumption.347
No such presumption applies to state tort claims. Instead, courts examine
the appropriateness of applying state tort laws through choice-of-law analysis.
The likelihood that state tort laws will be applied to regulate foreign torts
depends on the choice-of-law approach employed and the manner in which
courts employ it. Some approaches will rarely result in the application of state
tort laws to regulate foreign torts. For example, jurisdictions that maintain the
traditional lex loci delicti approach will rarely apply state tort laws to regulate
foreign torts. Other approaches that focus on factors and interests afford courts
significant discretion to apply state tort laws extraterritorially. For example,
given the governmental interests at stake, courts in the District of Columbia
routinely have applied domestic state tort laws to regulate overseas terrorism.
Human rights litigation in state courts under state law requires careful
choice-of-law analysis. To test how leading ATS cases might fare in state court
under state law, this Article examines a number of human rights test cases
from a choice-of-law perspective. The results are not surprising: territoriality
and personality strongly affect the outcome under all the choice-of-law
approaches. The stronger the forum’s nexus to the conduct, injury, or parties,
the more likely it will apply forum law. Conversely, a weak nexus to the
345

654 F.3d 11, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
For a discussion of federal statutory tort laws preempting state laws but not foreign laws in the context
of death on the high seas, see Jackson v. N. Bank Towing Corp., 201 F.3d 415, 416–18 (5th Cir. 2000); Oyuela
v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d. 713, 724 (E.D. La. 2003); Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n,
644 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D.R.I. 1986); and Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d 423, 434–35 (Tex.
1999).
347 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
346
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territory or the parties will almost invariably result in the application of foreign
law.
This Article concludes with a brief analysis of the virtues of transnational
litigation in state court compared with federal court litigation of international
law claims under the ATS. First, unlike the ATS, state tort laws apply
extraterritorially. Subject to constitutional limits, there are no presumptions
that limit the extraterritorial application of state tort laws. Second, civil liability
for wrongful conduct is universal. In almost every jurisdiction, a tortfeasor will
be held civilly liable for tortious conduct that causes harm to others. Third, tort
claims have much lower liability thresholds than the standards applied under
international law. By lowering the threshold, transnational tort claims regulate
harmful activities that fall below the human rights threshold of grave public
wrongs. Fourth, the uncertainties relating to corporate liability under
international law are nonexistent with transnational torts. Corporate liability is
an accepted principle of tort law throughout the world. Fifth, applying choiceof-law principles minimizes the risk of discriminatory liability for corporations
amenable to suit in the United States. Sixth, pursuing human rights claims in
state court allows plaintiffs to avoid the heightened pleading standards of
federal courts. Seventh, suits filed in state court are less likely to be dismissed
on the basis of forum non conveniens because state court standards are often
less stringent. Eighth, reframing a human rights claim as a traditional state law
tort decreases the likelihood that the claim will be dismissed on preemption
grounds. Pleading the claim under foreign law dramatically decreases this
likelihood.
Transnational tort litigation cannot replace the old version of ATS
litigation. Pursuing human rights violations in state court under state law has
merits and demerits. But after Kiobel, human rights lawyers have precious few
alternatives. If human rights lawyers are looking for a silver lining to Kiobel,
they will find it in the opportunities that transnational tort litigation offers.

